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Abstract 
 
Universities and Carbon Neutrality: Motivation to Act and How to Create a Domino Effect 
Jason Schwartz 
 
 
Committee members: Dr. Javier Hidalgo, Chair; Dr. Christopher von Rueden, and Dr. Jeppe 
von Platz 
 
 
 
 
This research seeks to understand why universities, or other small actors, have pledged carbon 
neutrality, if these reasons are valid, and if there is room to expand upon existing efforts. In 
answering these questions, I will investigate whether aggressive climate change mitigation 
passes a cost-benefit analysis, the nature of individual obligations, and how positive duties can 
spur social action. Finally, I recommend ways universities can create larger change, through 
trending social norms.  
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Introduction 
 
In 2006 twelve university presidents all signed pledges committing their campus to 
carbon neutrality. Some were motivated by the scientific urgency to take action. Many did so 
because they felt it was the right thing to do and it aligned with other core institutional values. 
Others felt it was an internal educational opportunity, using this initiative as a powerful tool to 
motivate student awareness and action. Finally, a few college presidents recognized the potential 
to pressure similar organizations to follow in their example, creating new normative expectations 
for such behavior and guiding followers along the way. 
 Few will disagree that carbon neutrality pledges have good intentions, yet they still face 
several criticisms regarding underlying premises. First, opponents like Bjorn Lomborg push back 
on the focus of mitigating climate change, arguing that the high costs of abating emissions today 
are not worth the expected return. If actors, like universities, were interested in maximizing the 
impact of each dollar, such funds could be better allocated towards poverty alleviation, 
education, or vaccine research. His argument pushes back both against the gravity of scientific 
models and the urgency of expensive solutions. Next, former university administrators, like 
president Stanley Fish, reject political movements at universities, arguing there are institutions in 
society better suited for such aims, even when facing a global injustice. Finally, philosophers like 
Walter-Sinnott Armstrong claim “it¶s not my fault´ and argue that small actors are incapable of 
inflicting any discernable harm on others. Instead, he believes it is up to government to take 
action which will limit actors on a large scale, rather than focusing on individual behavioral 
change. Furthermore, he goes on to argue that we aren¶t as influential as we think we are, 
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negating the potential impact of any domino effect or norm change. I hold that all three of these 
arguments are incorrect. 
In my thesis, I seek to answer questions about climate change, individual obligations, and 
social norm research, particularly for universities as first movers. First, I investigate the 
consensus on climate change science and controversies surrounding economic models. This 
invokes questions on how to monetize damages, setting a just discount rate, and the opportunity 
cost of funds. I argue that action to mitigate climate change passes a cost-benefit analysis, 
pushing back against Lomborg¶s science and narrow utilitarian framework, which lacks key 
ethical considerations. 
Pushing back against Fish, I hold that universities, like all actors in society, are not 
excused of negative duty not to harm others and a positive duty to assist in time of moral 
emergencies, as seen with climate change. This then extends into my argument that all small 
actors, from the individual to a rural liberal arts college up to a state university, have a duty to 
mitigate their emissions as part of an obligation not to contribute to climate change as a 
collective action problem. Ignoring these risks given such devastating effects is a flaw in moral 
calculus and patently ignores concerns for scarcity and equity. Aside from undervaluing the 
impact of a small actor, Armstrong also treats such behavioral change in isolation, failing to 
account for any spillover effect of mitigating action. 
This argument extends to universities, as specially motivated actors who can be among 
the first to achieve carbon neutrality, creating a new social norm in the process and modeling 
efficient solutions. I use social norm research to understand how universities can build upon their 
own efforts to convince followers, from students to large corporations or states, to strive for 
GHG reductions, using examples to highlight best practices and opportunities for improvement. 
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To conclude, I will rely heavily on a case study from the University of California, using their 
campuses as test labs for sustainability and creating a guide on scalable solutions for others to 
follow. Stacked together, this thesis stands to argue there is real value in campus led carbon 
neutrality efforts, for students, for society at large, and for the environment.  
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Chapter One 
 
The planet is warming, it is human caused, and if action is not taken to properly mitigate 
and adapt to the effects of climate change, there will be drastic consequences. This chapter 
examines this imperative, arguing that a volatile climate violates human rights. Such a climate 
has the potential to severely harm the interests of current and future generations, specifically 
those most vulnerable. The urgency to act is expedited by current failures to take meaningful 
action, as well as increased scientific evidence regarding the risk of catastrophic tipping points. 
Given the well-founded risk of severe human rights violations there are strong moral and 
prudential reasons to take sufficient action now that will align global action with the scientific 
consensus. This view, however, has met resistance from climate skeptics, such as Bjorn 
Lomborg, who pushes back against scientific evidence that climate change will be detrimental 
and argues that the benefits of mitigation do not justify the immense costs. Lomborg also argues 
that one dollar towards climate change can be better spent on causes that will produce more 
social good. Although I agree with some of Lomborg¶s ideas, such as rebutting emotionally 
charged rhetoric and highlighting inefficient solutions, I will provide empirical evidence and 
ethical arguments which push back against Lomborg, maintaining that strong action against 
climate change is morally required.  
 
The Science 
Before diving into the ethical arguments surrounding climate change, it is important to 
present a basic overview on what the scientific consensus views as the biggest risks associated 
with climate change and how severe these impacts could be. It is one thing to say climate change 
 7 
will be catastrophic for humanity; however, it is necessary to define exactly how climate change 
will affect present and future generations.  
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is often regarded as the leading 
source of scientific reports surrounding climate change and is made up of more than 1,300 
scientists from around the world. The IPCC¶s special report released in 2018 highlights the 
largest and most severe impacts of 1.5-2 degrees C of warming.1 The report finds that this 1.5-
degree limit will likely be surpassed anywhere from 2030 to 2052 if current emission levels 
continue. Preventing warming of 1.5 degrees would require carbon neutrality by 2050, a target 
that even the most ambitious countries will likely struggle to meet. To avoid 2 degrees of 
warming, emissions would need to be cut 25% by 2030 with carbon neutrality reached by 2075. 
While both are not impossible goals, neither seems realistic given current emissions and 
mitigation efforts. According to the Climate Action Tracker, current Paris pledges would result 
in 3 degrees C of warming if met, and only 7 countries, most of which are not major emitters, are 
on track to meet their goal.2 
Although the report acknowledges that there may be some positive externalities for 
countries that normally experience extreme cold conditions, on the whole this is not a positive 
outlook for the planet. The most commonly associated effects of increasing the global 
temperature of the earth are an increase in extreme heat events, droughts, and irregular rainfall 
patterns and a rise in the intensity and frequency of extreme weather events. 
 Dealing with these main categories first, a study in Nature found that for every degree 
Celsius of warming the number of heat waves will increase by 4 to 34 days per season.3 
 
1 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Global Warming of 1.5°C, 2018, http://www.ipcc.ch/report/sr15/. 
2 ³Home _ ClimaWe AcWion TUackeU", hWWpV://climaWeacWionWUackeU.oUg/. 
3 ³YeV, ClimaWe Change IV Making HeaW WaYeV MoUe Common,´ Yale Climate Connections, June 25, 2019, 
https://www.yaleclimateconnections.org/2019/06/heat-waves-and-climate-change-is-there-a-connection/. 
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Specifically, in the United States days above 105 degrees Fahrenheit will triple.4 Some 
consequences of such extreme heat include increased wild fires, reduced crop yield, increased 
crime rates, higher risk of vector-borne diseases, and increases in heat related deaths. The 
increase in temperature will also affect precipitation and storm patterns, causing either heavy rain 
or extreme drought in specific regions. Finally, climate change will increase the frequency and 
intensity of hurricanes and other extreme weather events. One of these extreme weather events 
alone can cause billions in damage, and several of the past years have broken records for the 
most and worst extreme weather events.5  
Another climate change phenomenon is sea level rise. The IPCC finds that 1.5 degrees of 
warming will cause approximately 0.26-0.77 m of mean sea level rise by 2100.6 This range 
increases by 0.1 m with 2 degrees of warming, which would put an additional 10 million people 
at risk. Beyond this threshold, there is an additional risk that if warming is not curtailed 
sufficiently, irreversible melting in Antarctica and the Greenland ice sheet will result in sea level 
rise of several meters.7 
Finally, the IPCC report highlights the increased risk of species and ecosystem loss at 2 
degrees of warming compared to 1.5. The ocean ecosystem is particularly vulnerable due to 
ocean acidification, which threatens the survival of the whole food chain with no visable solution 
in sight. When the ocean absorbs CO2, the pH becomes more acidic, reducing carbonate ions 
which form the building blocks for sea shells and corals.8 Ultimately, if ocean acidification is not 
 
4 Ibid 
5 ³E[WUeme WeaWheU and ClimaWe Change _ CenWeU foU ClimaWe and EneUg\ 
SolXWionV,´hWWpV://ZZZ.c2eV.oUg/conWenW/e[WUeme-weather-and-climate-change/. 
6 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Global Warming of 1.5°C, 5. 
7 Ibid 
8 ³Ocean AcidificaWion _ NaWional Oceanic and AWmoVpheUic AdminiVWUaWion,´, 
https://www.noaa.gov/education/resource-collections/ocean-coasts-education-resources/ocean-acidification. 
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reversed a large percentage of marine life at the bottom of the food chain will be wiped up, 
which then has the potential to move up throughout the food chain.  
 Overall, the IPCC report and the studies it cites give the best starting point for turning the 
scientific consensus into ethical duties and the obligation to act. The IPCC report is regarded as 
the most authoritative scientific stance on the current state of climate change, yet many 
prominent atmospheric scientists criticize these reports for being too conservative. One study in 
particular found that the language used by the IPCC overstated uncertainty, highlighting the 
double-edged sword of scientific rigor which can be abused when turning statistical confidence 
into biased policy recommendations, even when overwhelming scientific evidence proves 
otherwise.9 Another book on this issue found that climate scientists tend to overwhelmingly dull 
down their report due to a fear of being an “alarmist´ and have a tendency to stay towards the 
mean of climate science, although their data suggested that damages will be higher.10 
 
The Controversy  
 The science in favor of climate change has never been more absolute or compelling. We 
must act now to avoid the most detrimental and catastrophic events. Yet, there are claims that a 
rational approach to climate change does not entail aggressive mitigation today. Many leading 
economists will agree that climate change is one of many threats to humanity, however, the 
mitigation tactics currently available are expensive, too expensive to justify the benefits. 
Furthermore, the worst harms of climate change will not come until much later. Simply put, 
under a cost-benefit analysis, the benefits of mitigating climate change, while significant, are not 
 
9 ³SWaWiVWical LangXage BackV ConVeUYaWiVm in ClimaWe-Change Assessments | BioScience | Oxford Academic, 
https://academic.oup.com/bioscience/article-abstract/69/3/209/5382637. 
10 Michael Oppenheimer et al., Discerning Experts: The Practices of Scientific Assessment for Environmental Policy 
(Chicago ; London: University of Chicago Press, 2019). 
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sufficient to justify the high costs of limiting warming today. Given a variety of social issues and 
our world¶s limited budget, many economists argue a rational approach seeks to maximize the 
social impact of each dollar. Thus, every dollar that is inefficiently spent on climate change has 
an opportunity cost, and what is given up is not insignificant. 
 This argument is most notably advocated by Lomborg who uses scientific reports and 
economic analysis to cut through emotionally charged rhetoric, seeking a rational and utility 
maximizing approach. First, Lomborg argues that the solutions we propose for climate change 
are highly ineffective. For example, Lomborg estimates that the pledges agreed upon at the Paris 
Climate Accord would cut global warming by just 0.17º C if met and cost the global economy 
approximately $730 billion a year for just the EU, Mexico, U.S. and China.11 This is incredibly 
expensive and will do very little social good. Every dollar that is inefficiently spent trying to 
combat climate change could be better allocated to more deserving causes in society. Lomborg 
highlights several important social issues such as poverty reduction, education, malaria nets, and 
research to cure diseases among several others. In each of these categories, one dollar can do 
more social good, in many cases saving lives.12 
 This is not merely a hypothetical argument. Lomborg worked with several Nobel 
Laurates in Economics to answer the question, what is the best way to spend $75 billion.13 The 
committee considered several opportunities and ranked communicable diseases such as HIV and 
malaria, malnutrition, and trade liberalization among the top categories. Notably, climate change 
was at the bottom of this list.  
 
11 BjoUn LomboUg, ³WhaW¶V The PUice Tag Of PaUiV¶ ClimaWe SXmmiW? Don¶W AVk The PoliWicianV,´ FoUbeV, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bjornlomborg/2015/12/07/whats-the-price-tag-of-paris-dont-ask-the-politicians/. 
12 Bjørn Lomborg, How to Spend 75 Billion to Make the World a Better Place (Washington, D.C.: Copenhagen 
Consensus Center, 2013). 
13 ibid 
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Thus, Lomborg argues as follows. First, the world should seek to invest in solutions 
which will actually produce results for less money. Some of these solutions include investing in 
R&D for technologies such as renewable energy, carbon sequestration, and geoengineering 
testing. When these solutions become cost-effective they should be deployed. In the meantime, 
actors should focus on adaptation, which many wealthy countries have had great success with 
during past changes in sea level rise and variable weather events. I agree with part of Lomborg¶s 
analysis and as I will discuss later, efficient and cost-effective solutions must be prioritized. Still, 
many technologies are far from development, such as carbon sequestration, or carry high risks, 
like solar radiation management. While some very wealthy countries, like the Netherlands, have 
adapted to changes in climate, these shifts were gradual and of a smaller scale.14 
Using an economic lens, Lomborg argues that the efficient level of emissions is actually 
above the 1.5 or 2-degree threshold, since a global effort to meet these goals would fail a cost-
benefit analysis. That is to say, Lomborg acknowledges the benefits of mitigating climate change 
in the long term, however, he argues it is too expensive to commence aggressive mitigation 
today and this does relatively little social good. Furthermore, since the cost of accomplishing this 
goal is likely in the order of trillions of dollars, this inefficient spending deprives other causes 
which can produce more social good today. Lomborg relies on IPCC reports and leading 
economists to derive this argument, yet there are several reasons to be skeptical of its conclusion. 
Throughout this chapter I will chip away at Lomborg¶s thesis, providing evidence based 
and ethical arguments that will defend a global obligation to do more than Lomborg¶s 
recommendation. Although this obligation is vague, it pushes back against Lomborg¶s models 
 
14 FUanV Klijn eW al., ³AVVeVVmenW of Whe NeWheUlandV¶ Flood RiVk ManagemenW Polic\ UndeU Global Change,´ 
AMBIO 41, no. 2 (March 1, 2012): 180±92, https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-011-0193-x. 
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and ethical framework, in favor of more urgent and impactful action to mitigate climate change 
today.  
First, I will evaluate the scientific evidence used, and, more importantly, neglected by 
Lomborg¶s models, focusing specifically on positive feedback cycles and extreme tipping points. 
I will argue that undervaluing this scientific evidence, which informs the economic models, leads 
to an incomplete conclusion. I will also argue that the solutions Lomborg proposes, while 
important in the long-term, are insufficient in the short term to sufficiently guard against the risk 
of extreme warming, thus stronger action is required. 
 Next, I will argue against the economic models themselves. This section is informed by 
the scientific evidence mentioned before, however, also brings in an ethical component for 
discussing the morality of a discount rate and incomplete cost-benefit analysis. Putting aside 
scientific inaccuracies, there are still compelling reasons to reject these models, due to the strong 
influence of the discount rate, which I argue is flawed. I also argue these models are inherently 
subjective when putting a price on human life and the environment, and thus should not be 
interpreted as absolute guides. 
 Finally, I maintain a strong moral duty to mitigate climate change, even if it is not the 
most efficient allocation of resources. This duty is informed by a humanitarian argument which 
takes into account equity and holds that human caused harms are worse than allowing harm. I 
also argue that compensation for harm is not morally sufficient. Overall, this argument does not 
set a cap at a specific amount of warming or argue for a minimum global response. Instead, I 
simply argue that extreme warming is unacceptable and action must be taken now to ensure this 
does not take place.   
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Pushing Back Against Lomborg¶s Science 
Given vast uncertainties in our planet¶s climate, it can be extremely difficult to predict 
how human activity can change the equilibrium and to what extent. As a result, leading reports 
from NASA and the IPCC tend to favor vague language when discussing future damages, as 
there is a large range of uncertainty.15 Still, the scientific consensus has agreed upon several 
major risks, alluded to earlier, and although there is a wide range of damage, depending on the 
degree of warming, most studies tend to the middle ground. Even the IPCC admits these figures 
are more likely to be underestimates.16 There is a legitimate concern, however, that Lomborg 
selects climate change studies which are overwhelmingly optimistic, or chooses the lower bound 
of studies, softening their conclusions. Although this argument does not apply for every 
application surrounding climate change, it is important to assess the validity of the data Lomborg 
uses to defend his thesis, as it often differs from the scientific consensus.  
Sea level rise is one of the most commonly associated threats with climate change and 
Lomborg¶s treatment of this contentious issue reveals a flaw in his analysis. Approximately 40% 
of the world¶s population lives within 100 kilometers of the coast, and thus any significant 
increase in sea level has a high probability of putting their home and safety at risk.17 Increasing 
the concentration of carbon in the atmosphere will cause sea levels to rise in two different ways. 
First, as Lomborg acknowledges, heating the temperature of the ocean melts land-based ice such 
as glaciers and ice sheets, which hold about 68.7% of all freshwater on the planet.18 Secondly, 
and of greater consequence, thermal expansion occurs when oceans absorb around 90% of the 
 
15 ³SWaWiVWical LangXage BackV ConVeUYaWiVm in ClimaWe-Change Assessments | BioScience | Oxford Academic.´ 
16 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Global Warming of 1.5°C, 5. 
17 ³Ocean-Fact-Sheet-Package.Pdf,´, https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/Ocean-fact-sheet-package.pdf.  
18 Ibid 
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atmospheres heat, causing water molecules to expand.19 Together, these effects will continue to 
cause sea level rise at exponential rates. Yet, this conclusion, founded in numerous academic 
papers from the IPCC, National Ocean Service, and NASA, is not how Lomborg presents the 
issue.  
Instead, he relies on one U.N. report from 2007 which finds that sea levels may rise by 
one foot over the next century.20 However, Stefan Rahmstofr, lead author of the study 
Lomborg¶s claims rest on, has come out to publicly criticize Lomborg¶s treatment of this 
outdated report, arguing that the 12-20 inch range of sea level rise was a base scenario, not an 
upper range, that does not include many of the “uncertainties in climate-carbon cycle feedbacks, 
nor the full effects of changes in ice sheet flow,´ thus making this report not only incomplete, but 
obsolete.21 Although Lomborg has acknowledged these caveats, he still presents the one foot of 
sea level rise as the official stance of the IPCC. The IPCC has since come out with numerous 
reports which find, with high confidence, that as global temperatures increase, the rate of sea 
level rise will also increase exponentially.22 The lower bound in the report, based on a scenario 
of extreme mitigation is around 1 foot, however under more realistic scenarios, given the lack of 
global efforts to mitigate emissions and positive feedback loops, this number goes up to around 3 
feet by the end of the century, and significantly higher in the future.23 Another important caveat 
 
19 ³NASA Sea LeYel Change PoUWal: TheUmal E[panVion,´ NASA Sea LeYel Change PoUWal, 
https://sealevel.nasa.gov/understanding-sea-level/global-sea-level/thermal-expansion. 
20 S. RahmVWoUf eW al., ³RecenW ClimaWe ObVeUYaWionV CompaUed Wo PUojecWionV,´ Science 316, no. 5825 (May 4, 
2007): 709±709, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1136843. 
21 SWefan RahmVWoUf, ³SWefan RahmVWoUf: We Need Wo Face Whe RiVk of Rapidl\ RiVing SeaV,´ The Guardian, March 
3, 2009, sec. Environment, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/cif-green/2009/mar/03/sea-levels-rising. 
22 , https://www.ipcc.ch/srocc/. 
23 ³Special RepoUW on Whe Ocean and CU\oVpheUe in a Changing ClimaWe.´ 
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is that this is the global mean of sea level rise, meaning that many regions will face 
disproportionate impacts several times larger than the earth as a whole.24 
These qualifications should be recognized, and many have accused Lomborg of cherry-
picking or softening data to fit his thesis, with full books dedicated to debunking his sources and 
methods.25 As Lomborg has updated his work, he has aligned his scientific evidence with the 
official IPCC reports, however, there is still a concern about underestimation and presenting 
conservative or optimistic estimates, which contain several caveats, as absolute fact.26 This 
practice seeks to present absolute facts in a world of scientific uncertainty, and brings in value-
judgements, such as risk aversion. This is not to say that the studies Lomborg cites are 
objectively better or worse than other reports, but rather to interject that all climate science must 
be balanced and interpreted with full context.  
More important than which scientific studies Lomborg includes, is what he omits. The 
scope of Lomborg¶s consideration is limited to a world of 2 degrees. There are serious concerns 
that warming will surpass this 2-degree threshold. The IPCC warns of a positive non-linear 
relationship moving forward as warming increases exponentially. This is due to positive 
feedback loops and tipping points, both of which are incredibly important yet often overlooked 
aspects of climate change. Tipping points occur “when Earth¶s climate abruptly moves between 
relatively stable states´ and are often seen as points of no return.27 Climate feedback loops refer 
to “process that can either amplify or diminish the effects of climate forcings,´ however with 
 
24 Na]UXl IVlam and John Winkel, ³ClimaWe Change and Social IneTXaliW\,´ UN Department of Economic & Social 
Affairs, October 2017, https://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2017/wp152_2017.pdf. 
25 Howard Friel, The Lomborg Deception: Setting the Record Straight about Global Warming (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2010). 
 
27 ³The SWXd\ of EaUWh aV an InWegUaWed S\VWem,´ ClimaWe Change: Vital Signs of the Planet, 2019, 
https://climate.nasa.gov/nasa_science/science. 
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climate change these processes are predominately positive, meaning they will exacerbate 
warming.28  
One example of both a negative and positive feedback is seen with clouds. As the earth 
warms, there will be more precipitation, which means more latent heat transfer, as the 
transformation of water vapor is a greenhouse gas. As this precipitation increases, there will be 
more clouds. These clouds increase the albedo effect, which reflects sunlight and cool the earth. 
However, high clouds also trap more heat, thus offsetting some of this cooling. Clouds are just 
one of several feedback loops identified by scientists at NASA. Researchers also pointed to a 
lack of tree growth, which removes approximately 50% of human CO2 from the atmosphere 
each year, shrinking ice, which also contributes to the albedo effect, and rapid release of frozen 
methane from the permafrost.29 Methane is roughly 30 times more potent than CO2 as a 
greenhouse gas and these large reserves of methane and other powerful greenhouses gases have 
great potential to accelerate warming at unpredictable and dangerous rates. 30 
While estimating the damages of 2 degrees of warming are difficult, trying to put an 
estimate on the effects of these feedback loops is an even more challenging task. Some studies, 
using mid-range IPCC figures, estimate these feedback loops can increase warming anywhere 
from 15% up to 78%, and these numbers were self-reported as conservative estimates.31 Likely, 
these loops will not be significant until later in the century, therefore a world of 4-6 degrees of 
warming becomes a much more realistic future, even if warming is limited to 2 degrees today. In 
Lomborg¶s writing, he makes little mention of positive feedback loops and tipping points 
 
28 ibid 
29 ibid 
30 OAR US EPA, ³OYeUYieZ of GUeenhoXVe GaVeV,´ OYeUYieZV and FacWVheeWV, US EPA, December 23, 2015, 
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/overview-greenhouse-gases. 
31 ³PoViWiYe Feedback beWZeen Global WaUming and AWmoVpheUic CO2 ConcenWUaWion InfeUUed fUom PaVW Climate 
Change - Scheffer - 2006 - Geophysical Research Letters - Wiley Online Library,, 
https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1029/2005GL025044. 
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associated with climate change. More notably, as I will address later, the economic models 
Lomborg uses as the foundation of his argument completely omit these feedback loops. This is a 
grave mistake which dramatically shifts the outcome of Lomborg¶s analysis, making it 
inconclusive.  
 
The Solutions: No Easy Fix 
Given Lomborg¶s perspective about the effects of climate change, he argues that the 
solutions for climate change should be scaled accordingly. One report found staying below the 2-
degree threshold global mitigation would cost approximately $221-388 billion per year by 2030, 
with upfront investment costs in 2030 as high as $897 billion per year.32 Nobel Prize winning 
Economist William Nordhaus estimated that limiting warming to 2.5 degrees would cost $134.6 
trillion.33 In comparison, Lomborg¶s own “solution´ would cost $100 billion per year for 
research and development, $1 billion on climate engineering, and $50 billion on adaptation 
efforts all from a modest carbon tax.34 This sounds highly appealing, and would remove many of 
the larger ethical obligations to reduce emissions.35 If complete solutions to climate change were 
relatively cheap, the urgency and necessity to go carbon neutral is dramatically reduced, 
especially for small actors. In this section I will argue there are no easy fixes to climate change 
and the illusion that we can pay a small fee while avoiding behavioral change is a moral hazard. 
 
32 ³PaWhZa\V Wo a LoZ-Carbon Economy: Version 2 of the Global Greenhouse Gas Abatement Cost Curve | 
McKinVe\,´, hWWpV://ZZZ.mckinsey.com/business-functions/sustainability/our-insights/pathways-to-a-low-carbon-
economy. 
33 ³A Nobel PUi]e foU Whe CUeaWoU of an Economic Model ThaW UndeUeVWimaWeV Whe RiVkV of ClimaWe Change,´ 
Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/news/a-nobel-prize-for-the-creator-of-an-economic-model-that-
underestimates-the-risks-of-climate-change/. 
34 Bjørn Lomborg, Cool It: The Skeptical Environmentalist¶s Guide to Global Warming, 1st Vintage Books ed (New 
York: Vintage Books, 2008). 
35 Ironically, while deep carbon reductions are expensive, Lomborg admits in his book, The Skeptical 
Environmentalist´, WhaW WheUe iV ³no Za\´ Whe coVWV, pUedicWed Wo be aboXW 2% of GNP, ZoXld ³Vend XV Wo Whe 
pooUhoXVe´, WhXV an\ illXVion of climaWe change mitigation dramatically halting economic progress is misguided. 
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While I support Lomborg¶s argument to prioritize cost-effective solutions, this does not mean 
that deeper change, while more expensive, does not pass a cost-benefit analysis. 
While technological innovation has enabled renewable energy to become the cheapest 
form of electricity, this took several decades, and only covers one sector of global greenhouse 
emissions.36 Electricity and heat production make up approximately 31% of such emissions, 
however the global transition to clean energy will still take decades.37 Other major sectors such 
as industry, transportation, buildings, concrete, agriculture, forestry, and land use do not have the 
same carbon free substitutes as the energy industry. Given that the clean energy transformation 
will take decades, and other industries still have no alternatives in sight, Lomborg¶s vision of 
research and development is overly optimistic for cheap alternatives on a reasonable time 
horizon. With the short time scale calculated by IPCC to remain below 1.5 degrees of warming, 
and subsequently prevent further warming through positive feedback loops, it is highly unlikely 
new clean innovations to replace pollutant heavy industries can play a major role in immediate 
efforts. 
 In response, Lomborg points to geoengineering as another option to buy more time and 
allow green alternatives to become economically competitive. Geoengineering comes in several 
different forms, including emitting sulfur particles in the atmosphere to block sunlight, marine 
cloud brightening, and large reflectors in space. While compelling, none of these technologies 
have undergone sufficient testing to declare safe, and none are guaranteed to work, and may even 
produce outcomes worse than business as usual with climate change.38 Although continued 
 
36 ³LeYeli]ed CoVW of EneUg\ and LeYeli]ed CoVW of SWoUage 2019,´ La]aUd.com, 
http://www.lazard.com/perspective/levelized-cost-of-energy-and-levelized-cost-of-storage-2019/. 
37 ³SoXUceV of GUeenhoXVe GaV EmiVVions | Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions | US EPA,´ 
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions. 
38 Alan Robock eW al., ³BenefiWV, RiVkV, and CoVWV of SWUaWoVpheUic GeoengineeUing,´ Geophysical Research Letters 
36, no. 19 (2009), https://doi.org/10.1029/2009GL039209. 
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funding of such efforts may eventually yield a different conclusion, the IPCC does not consider 
any solar radiation modification measures currently feasible to reach the 1.5-degree target, 
saying “SRM face large uncertainties and knowledge gaps as well as substantial risks, 
institutional and social constraints to deployment related to governance, ethics, and impacts on 
sustainable development.´ The report went on to point out such efforts will not reduce ocean 
acidification.39 While testing geoengineering is a rational approach, even proponents of 
geoengineering see it as a fallback option to stop tipping points and feedback loops, not a 
replacement for mitigation today. Lomborg may be correct to criticize the Paris Agreement and 
other international efforts to mitigate climate change through voluntary pledges and inefficient 
solutions, however his plan is also incomplete. Real solutions will require moral urgency and 
sacrifice. Proposing cheap Band-Aid fixes give the impression of a moral high ground, while 
emissions continue to rise and the climate crisis worsens for future generations.  
 
Economic Models 
Given Lomborg¶s analysis of the high costs to successfully mitigate climate change and 
relatively minimal benefits, Lomborg¶s economic models conclude that aggressive mitigation of 
climate change does not pass a cost-benefit analysis. This claim builds off the work of Professor 
William Nordhaus who won the Noble Prize in Economics for his analysis of climate change 
using a macroeconomic lens. One of Nordhaus¶s key findings was that a gradual and modest 
carbon tax, starting at around $27 per ton back in 2005, would be sufficient to limit global 
warming so that the costs of mitigating do not exceed the potential impact. Lomborg has run 
 
39 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Global Warming of 1.5°C. 
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with this idea, using Nordhaus¶s findings to argue that abating climate change will leave us “50 
trillion worse off.´4041  
Although Nordhaus¶s position still calls for action to prevent the worst effects of climate 
change, there are strong reasons to remain skeptical that his moderate tax is too low, and more 
aggressive initiatives will be needed. There are three main flaws with the economics models used 
by Nordhaus and Lomborg, aside from additional ethical concerns I will later address. First 
Nordhaus and Lomborg omit strong scientific evidence regarding extreme scenarios I referenced 
earlier and as a result their studies are highly disputed among scientific and economic experts. 
Furthermore, the economic models themselves are inherently flawed by trying to both a price on 
human life and the environment and subsequently using this cost-benefit analysis as a definitive 
guide on how to best approach climate change policy. Finally, I will examine the discount rate 
used and discuss practical and moral flaws with too high a rate. 
 
Lack of Extreme Warming Events and Inherent Flaws with Economic Models 
The first problem with Nordhaus and Lomborg¶s analysis is how they quantify the 
damage based on the leading science. Nordhaus¶s model fails to account for extreme warming 
events, positive feedback loops, and tipping points. I argue that putting a monetary value on 
climate change damages, especially effects such as war or migrants, is likely to be an 
underestimate and brings up contentious ethical issues. Thus, Nordhaus¶s model is incomplete 
 
40 Bj¡Un LomboUg, ³TUXWh IV Whe FiUVW CaVXalW\ of Global WaUming _ b\ Bj¡Un LomboUg,´ PUojecW Syndicate, 
December 18, 2018, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/climate-change-self-defeating-alarmism-by-
bjorn-lomborg-2018-12. 
41 Nordhaus himself has come out against such claims, arguing that the science behind climate change is resounding, 
and has shifted dramatically since his original economic analysis in 1992. To set the record straight, in an op-ed 
WiWled ³Wh\ Whe Global WaUming SkepWics Are WUong´ NoUdhaXV pXVheV back againVW Whe work of climate skeptics 
who favor postponing action. Nordhaus argued the science has increased in urgency that action now will have much 
greater implications for future generations, and that carefully guided mitigation efforts are not more harmful than 
inaction, especially given inherent flaws in the models surrounding uncertainty and extreme warming. 
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and the flaws of economic models in general reveal that economic models, while helpful, are not 
perfect for guiding decision making. 
 The IPCC report on 1.5 degrees of warming shies away from officially turning its 
findings into monetary values, further evidence of a commitment to conservative, yet accurate 
reports. There is strong evidence, however, that Nordhaus¶s damage functions do not align with 
the conclusions of this leading report, specifically regarding the risks catastrophic events. Using 
an expected rise in average income and a relatively high discount rate, Nordhaus concluded that 
climate change will only cost the world 2-4% of global GDP by the end of the century.42 This 
number is by itself contentious among scientists and political leaders due to disproportionate 
impacts, nevertheless the larger concern is that the model does not include the risk that warming 
will exponentially increase, even if human behavior dramatically shifts. In contrast, Sir Nicholas 
Stern, former Chief Economist of the World Bank, found that inaction would result in an annual 
loss of 5% of GDP, but that more extreme scenarios could jump as high as 20%.43 He later 
corrected his stance, claiming that his model likely underestimated these extreme risks by at least 
50% or more. 
Nordhaus admits that “our economic models have great difficulties incorporating these 
major geophysical changes and their impacts in a reliable manner,´ yet his model is still 
presented by Lomborg as a complete guide, used to reject claims of runaway warming.44 One 
scientific paper used Nordhaus¶s DICE model to show that 19º C of warming would only reduce 
 
42 ³InWegUaWed AVVeVVmenW ModelV of ClimaWe Change,´, hWWpV://ZZZ.nbeU.oUg/UepoUWeU/2017nXmbeU3/noUdhaXV.hWml. 
43 N. H. Stern, ed., The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
44 William D. NoUdhaXV, ³Wh\ Whe Global WaUming SkepWicV AUe WUong,´ MaUch 22, 2012, 
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2012/03/22/why-global-warming-skeptics-are-wrong/. 
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global GDP by 50 percent which highlights this disconnect.45 To Nordhaus¶s credit, many 
scientists and economists avoid putting an explicit number on damage functions given unknown 
variables out of fear of being wrong, and thus omit such possibilities completely. A paper on the 
philosophy of modeling unknown risks confirms that top academics avoid validating assertion 
out of fear of “making it up.´46 Thus few economic models include these risks which are difficult 
to quantify, and those that do are prone to underestimate how these effects interact.47 
 These judgmental adjustments are presented by Lomborg as sound predictions, yet, do 
not have solid backing and directly conflict with the scientific data. A recent study in Nature 
found that there is a 93% chance that warming surpasses 4 degrees by the end of the century, and 
that if it does so, damages for the global economy will be $23 trillion per year, a much larger 
percentage of GDP than Nordhaus estimates.48 This difference is significant, and although 
Nordhaus attempts to include “worse case scenarios,´ his undervaluation results in an incomplete 
analysis of climate change. Instead, Lomborg paints an optimistic view of these studies, 
highlighting lower bounds of damage as realistic projections and claiming in the future we will 
be better suited to adapt to these changes. Lomborg may be correct, but is this a possibility worth 
gambling? Stephen Gardner argues that present generations would be acting recklessly if they 
only took into account best-case scenarios and ignored severe projections, even if the former 
 
45 FUank AckeUman, Eli]abeWh A. SWanWon, and Ramyn BXeno, ³FaW TailV, E[ponenWV, E[WUeme UnceUWainW\: 
SimXlaWing CaWaVWUophe in DICE,´ Ecological Economics 69, no. 8 (June 15, 2010): 1657±65, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2010.03.013. 
46 ³PhilIVVXeVModelAVVeVVOUeVkeV.Pdf,´ , hWWp://hiVWoU\.XcVd.edX/_fileV/facXlW\/oUeVkeV-
naomi/PhilIssuesModelAssessOreskes.pdf. 
47 ³The MiVVing Economic RiVkV in AVVeVVmenWV of ClimaWe Change ImpacWV,´ Grantham Research Institute on 
Climate Change and the Environment (blog), accessed December 3, 2019, 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/publication/the-missing-economic-risks-in-assessments-of-climate-change-
impacts/. 
48 PaWUick T. BUoZn and Ken CaldeiUa, ³GUeaWeU FXWXUe Global WaUming InfeUUed fUom EaUWh¶V RecenW EneUg\ 
BXdgeW,´ Nature 552, no. 7683 (December 2017): 45±50, https://doi.org/10.1038/nature24672. 
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comes true.49 Using an analogy of retirement savings, one would not regret these savings if they 
suddenly win the lottery. Given statistical probabilities, it was the prudential thing to do.  
Furthermore, understanding how these damages are felt is more complicated. In addition 
to positive feedback loops in the climate, corresponding effects of climate change can cascade. 
For instance, drought and extreme weather events limit food production, which in turn make 
populations more vulnerable to disease and high heat. High heat and food scarcity can lead to a 
decrease in productivity hurting the economy, and potentially starting a refugee crisis or armed 
conflict, which further limits countries from managing climate damage.50 Given the high risk of 
extreme warming and the potential for this warming to snowball into catastrophic events, the 
cost of unabated climate change are much higher than Nordhaus or Lomborg present. 
 
Moral Reasons to be Skeptical of Cost-Benefit Analysis 
However, there is a deeper concern aside from pulling levers on models, changing the 
discount rate, or debating the cost of solutions. There are important flaws inherent to the cost-
benefit framework that Lomborg applies. Putting a monetary price on human lives or the 
environment is often incomplete, and can underestimate these revered aspects of life. In the face 
of uncertainty regarding ocean acidification, biodiversity loss, sea level rise, and long term 
warming, Nordhaus simply added 25% of monetized damages to reflect these non-monetized 
impacts, in what he admitted to be a “judgmental adjustment.´51 Such subjectivity has a high 
potential for empirical failure, yet a moral assessment reveals further flaws. 
 
49 Stephen Mark Gardiner, A Perfect Moral Storm: The Ethical Tragedy of Climate Change, Environmental Ethics 
and Science Policy Series (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
50 Naomi OUeVkeV and NicholaV SWeUn, ³Opinion _ ClimaWe Change Will CoVW UV EYen MoUe Than We Think,´ The 
New York Times, October 23, 2019, sec. Opinion, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/23/opinion/climate-change-
costs.html. 
51 ³A Nobel PUi]e foU Whe CUeaWoU of an Economic Model ThaW UndeUeVWimaWeV Whe RiVkV of ClimaWe Change.´ 
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Various countries have set different values on one human life, ranging around 6 to 9 
million.52 Many companies and policy makers use this number to inform decisions in their cost-
benefit analysis. Ford infamously valued a human life at around $200,000 and this resulted in 
their decision to not improve gas tank integrity which ultimately resulted in easily preventable 
deaths.53 Although some value is needed since the environment or a human life cannot be worth 
infinite utility, the results that can come from an undervaluation are morally troubling.  
This ethical framework can be applied to the cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of climate 
change in several ways. First, Lomborg places a value on everything from species diversity to 
maintaining ecosystems and preserving national parks. The subjective value for these goods will 
differ for each person. Furthermore, the effects of climate change are felt disproportionately 
across the globe. The average citizen in America is unlikely to feel the effects of climate change 
the same as a vulnerable population in a developing country. It is extremely difficult for CBA to 
calculate the effects of climate change on poor farmers in third world countries, when small 
ripple effects can have devastating consequences for their livelihood.  
Additionally, there is strong evidence that the effects of climate change will lead to 
scarcity of resources in areas already vulnerable to refugee crisis and war, exacerbating these 
global problems. Calculating potential refugees is vulnerable to many of the same flaws of all 
climate change predictions, and the IPCC statistic of 200 million climate migrants by 2050 is 
offered as a conservative average, between upper and lower bounds of 25 million to 1 billion.54 
The IPCC also acknowledges that climate change has a high probability of “threatening human 
 
52 ³ValXe of Life,´ in Wikipedia, October 13, 2019, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Value_of_life&oldid=921057121. 
53 ³THE FORD PINTO CASE:,´ hWWpV://XVeUV.ZfX.edX/palmiWaU/LaZ&ValXaWion/PapeUV/1999/Leggett-pinto.html. 
54 Etienne Piguet, Antoine Pécoud, and P. F. A. de Guchteneire, eds., Migration and Climate Change (Paris : 
Cambridge, UK ; New York: UNESCO Pub. ; Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
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security through undermining livelihoods, compromising culture and identity, increasing 
migration that people would rather have avoided, and challenging the ability of states to provide 
the conditions necessary for human security.´55 The UN went on to call climate change a “threat 
multiplier´ that can disrupt world peace in both concrete and less tangible ways.56  
These are two of numerous examples where assigning a monetary value to the effects of 
climate change is difficult, if not impossible to capture in an economic analysis. A price on a 
refugee crisis, war, or crop failure in an agrarian society may be roughly estimated, but that does 
not speak to its accuracy or morality. Philosopher John Broome pushes back against the 
application of CBA and expected-utility in such cases due to this high degree of uncertainty.57 
While he normally supports both tools, he argues that climate change poses a moral disaster for 
future generations and the variance in long-term estimates renders these economic methods of 
evaluation useless. To illustrate this, he points to examples where the future has changed in ways 
that are “utterly unpredictable´ to past generations.  
Is Broome right, is there absolutely no room for CBA in predicting climate change 
damages? I think such an extreme approach is misguided. Even though CBA may be 
fundamentally flawed for long-term estimates, it can be a powerful motivator for action when 
done transparently and with ethical considerations. Lomborg points out that lines must be drawn, 
however, without debate about these lines, the results of CBA can lead to contentious 
speculation. Scientists and economists should continue to work together to inform relevant actors 
 
55 Adger,W.N., J.M. Pulhin, J. Barnett, G.D. Dabelko, G.K. Hovelsrud, M. Levy, Ú. Oswald Spring, and C.H. 
Vogel, ³HXman SecXUiW\,´ Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and 
Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change Cambridge University Press (n.d.). 
56 ³ClimaWe Change Recogni]ed aV µThUeaW MXlWiplieU¶, UN SecXUiW\ CoXncil DebaWeV IWV ImpacW on Peace,´ UN 
News, January 25, 2019, https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/01/1031322. 
57 John BUoome, ³CoXnWing Whe CoVW of Global WaUming,´ Environmental Values 1, no. 4 (1992): 363±364. 
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on best estimates for damages while working to educate the public on how to best contextualize 
these results as inherently imperfect guidelines for steering policy.   
 
Discount Rate 
While the underlying science in Nordhaus¶s model may be flawed and monetary damages 
are likely underestimated, the discount rate used has the greatest impact on his model. As a result 
of this weight, setting a social discount rate in economic analysis is highly controversial. A 
discount rate roughly accounts for two factors, first that societies in the future will be better off, 
thus a dollar today is worth more than in the future, and secondly what economists call our 
“revealed time preference´ or our impatience. If given the choice between $100 in a few years or 
$50 today, there are a variety of factors that would impact this decision, such as immediate need 
and potential ROI. However, when deciding whether we should invest billions of dollars into 
climate change mitigation, which will mainly support future generations, or use the money to 
fight food insecurity, cancer, or insect-borne diseases today, such debates grow more difficult.58 
To give an illustration of how extreme the implications of a discount rate can be, economist 
Graciela Chichilnisky calculated that with a discount rate of 5%, the present value of the entire 
earth¶s aggregate output would be a few hundred thousand dollars in 200 years. 59 Chichilnisky 
went on to find that given this evaluation, we would be willing to pay “no more than one is 
willing to invest in an apartment´ to prevent the destruction of the earth.  
 
58 Although most mitigation efforts are concerned with minimizing the risk of the worst effects of climate change, 
there are significant effects that will be felt today, specifically regarding extreme weather events. Such impacts must 
not be ignored when debating where to set the discount rate.  
59 GUaciela ChichilniVk\, ³An A[iomaWic AppUoach Wo SXVWainable DeYelopmenW,´ Social Choice and Welfare 13, no. 
2 (April 1996): 231±57, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00183353. 
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There are no easy answers when deciding what is owed to the future while weighing 
harms to present generations, especially given the high degree of unknown risk. Proponents of no 
discount rate, such as F.P. Ramsey, take a full utilitarian approach, arguing that the outcome of 
any decision should be weighed based on its total utility to all persons, regardless of whether 
they are currently living or in the future. Ramsey argues that total utility is most important, and 
recipients are merely “vessels.´60 Under this view, all generations deserve equal moral weight 
since valuing one individual over another would be fundamentally wrong.  
Practically, such a low discount rate, given the potential for infinite generations would 
require sacrifice on an unreasonable scale, in many ways paralyzing the present generation. 
Furthermore, given vast uncertainty about the needs of future generations it would be impossible 
to try and account for such preferences. In addition to practical considerations of protecting 
against such extreme ripple effects, I believe there are compelling ethical reasons to allow some 
discounting of the future while still staying in line with common sense morality.  
This expands on philosopher David Hume¶s idea of human morality based on our 
behavior and interactions with others. This agent-relative relationship reflects the values that 
allow us to build and develop human connections. Consider an elder woman drafting a will. She 
might give a large portion to her children and other immediate relatives, and maybe a smaller 
portion to her grandchildren, and possibly, for the sake of argument, a small amount to start a 
college fund for her great grandchildren, but it would be out of the ordinary and unexpected for 
her to think any further down her lineage. Furthermore, someone who was her great-great 
grandchild would not, by any normal account, be justified in arguing they have been wronged 
out of their share of inheritance if they receive nothing. 
 
60 WilfUed BeckeUman and CameUon HepbXUn, ³EWhicV of Whe DiVcoXnW RaWe in Whe SWeUn ReYieZ on Whe EconomicV of 
ClimaWe Change´ 8, no. 1 (2007): 25. 
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 This is because one way we build and maintain relationships is through exclusivity. One 
of the highest expressions of affection is putting one individual or group over the needs or 
desires of others. We do this with relatives, friends, members of the same religious group, and 
neighbors. Thus, the preference for reciprocal altruism between individuals may be essential for 
forming relationships and bonds, something to weigh over the utilitarian calculus of maximizing 
overall utility. Furthermore, it would be unreasonable to demand the individual must sacrifice all 
present well-being and desires for future generations. Requiring this not only harms 
relationships, but individual value and meaning. 
Of course, this view is not perfect either. There is a legitimate concern that weighing 
preferences over utility can lead to exploitation, harming minority and underrepresented groups, 
in this case future generations who have no voice at the table when it comes to these debates. In 
defending a lower discount rate in his economic model of climate change, Sir Nicholas Stern 
argues that with pure time discounting of a mere 2%, one would be giving half the weight of 
someone born today as opposed to someone born 35 years ago.61  
To illustrate Stern¶s point, imagine one builds a bomb. It seems irrelevant whether that 
bomb goes off today, in 35 years, or in 500 years, as long as this bomb presents a potential threat 
to harm others, it should be prosecuted today as such a harm. A high discount rate greatly 
discredits the harm we cause today which will drastically affect future generations. Stern argues 
there is no moral justification for this. Although he acknowledges that in our own lives it may be 
morally permissible to want a dollar today versus a dollar in an unknown future, Stern rejects a 
high social discount rate, favoring only a modest one that takes into account increases in global 
income.  
 
61 DaYid Biello, ³ClaVh: SiU NicholaV SWeUn,´ ScienWific AmeUican, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/clash-
sir-nicholas-stern/. 
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In respect to climate change, a relatively small change in discount rate can completely 
change the results. Famously, the Stern review favored aggressive mitigation of climate change 
while using a discount rate of 1.6% as compared to Nordhaus¶s discount rate of 5.5% or 
Lomborg¶s range of 4-6%.62 Putting monetary values on this debate, helps make the argument 
more concrete. Using Nordhaus¶s discount rate, 5 trillion in damages in 100 years would only be 
worth $72 billion today.63  
There is no perfect discount rate, but discount rates, such as the one used by Nordhaus are 
stripped of moral considerations and justified by a descriptive approach, which only considers 
revealed preferences. This ignores ethical judgement regarding the treatment of future 
generations. While a discount rate of zero would be too limiting, adding moral considerations 
regarding future generations, especially given a high risk, would dramatically alter the moral 
urgency to act today.   
Thus, I propose a moral balance to weigh both present relationships and long-term 
utilitarian ethics, without paralyzing society today. For positive duties to help others, it would be 
unreasonable to hold that individuals must give great weight to countless iterations of future 
generations. Aside from the impossibility of knowing what the future needs, it is not immoral to 
prioritize immediate relationships, such as buying gifts or traveling to spend time with family. 
However, this argument does not apply to negative duties to refrain from harming others. Just as 
I highlighted with the bomb example, the timeline of harm is irrelevant to the moral validity of 
the act. A bomb has many similarities to the devastating effects of climate change. Both acts 
have a high certainty of inflicting harm and the harm is unequivocally detrimental to future 
 
62 ³The EWhicV of ClimaWe Change,´ SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, 2008, 6. 
63 ³DiVcoXnW RaWeV: A BoUing Thing YoX ShoXld KnoZ aboXW (ZiWh OWWeUV!),´ Grist (blog), September 24, 2012, 
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interests. These two factors separate climate change from other considerations, avoiding the 
“paralyzed objection´ while imposing a strict negative duty to avoid severe harms, regardless of 
the time horizon. 
There is no precise number that satisfies these conflicting desires, but the lack of ethical 
consideration in the discount rate used by Nordhaus and Lomborg reveals an unwarranted 
omission in their methods. Thus, the economic models they run are inherently flawed and should 
not be considered precise tools for guiding our decision making. 
 
Ethics of Average Utilitarianism 
There will continue to be disagreement on how to turn scientific predictions into 
economic models, but the final piece to Lomborg¶s argument is that funds have an opportunity 
cost. In this section I will argue against Lomborg¶s average utilitarian ethical framework in favor 
of a humanitarian approach that seeks to limit harm, especially to the most vulnerable. I also 
argue that failing to take significant action against anthropogenic climate change is morally 
worse than allowing other harms, where human activity is less culpable. Finally, I hold that due 
to this negative duty, compensation for the harms of climate change is not morally defensible, 
and full mitigation and adaptation is required. 
Lomborg uses an average utilitarian ethical framework, which, per its name, seeks to 
maximize the average utility. Lomborg persuasively argues that there is an efficient level of 
climate change, which takes into account expected harm and, most importantly, how much it 
would cost to mitigate or adapt. Given a limited budget for social causes and pressing issues like 
malaria, poverty, or low education rates, one dollar spent on any of these issues is likely to do 
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more social good in the present. However, there are compelling reasons why doing the most 
social good may not be the correct moral viewpoint.  
First, using an average utilitarian approach, would favor an outcome where a group of 10 
individuals with $10 each is better than 100 with $9. More importantly, such a framework would 
allow society to harm certain individuals as long as it increases the average utility. A community 
could torture one individual or take someone¶s organs without their consent as long as average 
utility goes up from those who take pleasure in watching or receive those organs. This fails to 
draw a line on unacceptable behaviors, regardless of potential payoffs. 
This strikes many of us as fundamentally wrong, and the application to climate change is 
no different. As Lomborg points out, the world only spends a limited amount of resources to 
various social causes thus he argues this money should go to where it can help the most people. 
There are likely hundreds of billions of dollars inefficiently spent each year under Lomborg¶s 
view. It can be idealistic to say we should simply give more, however scarcity will always be 
relevant, and tradeoffs must be made. Lomborg may be correct, the $100 billion pledged by the 
Paris Accord for climate change could be allocated towards causes that may improve average 
utility, however I argue this is a false equivocation, money spent alleviating climate change also 
benefits poverty and health concerns, and this approach ignores responsibility for acts and the 
role of uncertainty.  
Underlying this argument is a conception of human rights. There is a certain threshold 
that no individual should have to sink below. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
declares “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.´ Therefore, it is morally 
unacceptable to push some individual below this designated “line´ in order to raise cumulative 
utility. Applying this to climate change, philosophers like Simon Caney argue that the effects of 
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climate change will deprive individuals of human rights in several ways.64 Climate change will 
violate the right to life by death from extreme storms or heat waves. It will violate human health 
by increasing risks of disease. It will violate the right to substance by destroying one¶s home or 
source of food. These rights to life, health, and the ability to provide for oneself are not 
fundamentally controversial. As Caney argues, there are other rights that deserve merit, such as 
the right to not be forced out of one¶s home, however these rights are less absolute relative to 
other concerns. This also does not take into account damage to biodiversity and the environment.  
Lomborg may contest that many of the social issues he is concerned with also involve 
human rights violations, however this connection may be more dubious. There is a notable moral 
difference between allowing suffering in the world and directly causing that suffering. When 
looking closely at the language used to define human rights, the clause “other people do not 
deprive them´ is present.65 This is morally relevant when looking at the causes Lomborg 
advocates allocating money towards.  
When a deadly hurricane or flood hits a third world country, there is always an immediate 
global push to provide humanitarian aid, and many feel it is their duty to do so. Just as one would 
not walk by a drowning child without helping, many feel guilt sitting idly by knowing that others 
are facing extreme harm, regardless of whether or not they or anyone played a role in causing 
this harm. However, the nature of the obligation changes when one did play a role in causing a 
specific harm. If someone engages in actions which greatly increase the risk of such a harm, they 
have a corresponding duty to stop committing that harm and to alleviate the effect of this harm 
on any recipients. This positive duty obligates them to a higher standard to save the person they 
 
64 Simon Cane\, ³ClimaWe Change, HXman RighWV and MoUal ThUeVholdV,´ in Human Rights and Climate Change, 
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harmed over the negative duty to help the individual who is harmed as a result of bad luck or 
unfortunate circumstance. While education, healthcare, and poverty reduction are important 
aims, there are different duties when remediating these harms versus climate related harms that 
human action has and continues to directly contribute towards.  
A simple response from Lomborg would be to argue that many of the harms in the world 
he is concerned with fixing are, in fact, human caused. Poverty, lack of education, trade barriers 
and global hunger cannot be directly compared to unmotivated natural disasters. While disease is 
not human caused, human activity can worsen certain diseases. Still, the harms that Lomborg 
ranks high on his list of efficient social spending are mainly natural phenomenon or only 
maintain a weak linkage to human behavior. This cannot be fairly compared to the extent of 
human blame for climate change. Furthermore, there is a false equivocation that the world cannot 
afford to balance both priorities. Even Lomborg admits society is rich enough to solve a 
combination of these challenges, and climate change may direct global attention towards these 
issues in new ways, as past efforts have continuously failed to motivate action.66 Money spent on 
climate change can also help alleviate poverty, disease, and inequality, providing a spillover 
effect into almost all of the categories Lomborg identifies in his development goals. 
Additionally, facing Lomborg on his terms, there is little reason to believe getting the 
most marginal good out of each dollar should be limited to just today. As I mentioned earlier, the 
ethical justification for a high discount rate rests on shaky moral principles, and the threat of 
climate change has the potential to severely exacerbate the harms Lomborg is concerned with 
along with detrimental new harms associated with extreme warming. 
 
66 Bjørn Lomborg, The Skeptical Environmentalist: Measuring the Real State of the World (Cambridge ; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
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 Finally, Lomborg is comparing known harms to uncertain risks. Nordhaus himself 
compares failure to act on climate change to spinning a roulette wheel, with red spaces being 
relatively moderate scenarios, black spaces confirming the fears of the IPCC report, and the 
green 0 and 00 spots representing a worst case scenario of runaway warming.67 Lomborg sees the 
wheel as mostly filled with red spaces, however, throughout this chapter I have argued that an 
overwhelming majority of scientists disagree with this assessment. As time goes on, the number 
of black and green spots will increase, and each “spin´ will result in a higher probability of the 
ball landing on one of these spots, resulting in unacceptable global damage. A malaria net, 
medication, or micronutrients will save a set number of lives, but facing uncertainty does not 
mean funding for climate change is always sacrificing more lives, especially when the future of 
the entire planet is gambled.  
There is no objective moral stance on how to judge acceptable levels of risk and potential 
damage functions, thus Lomborg¶s data-backed proposition is appealing. If, however, Lomborg 
underestimates this risk, as leading climate scientists argue he does, then in hindsight his 
proposal will be seen as counterintuitive towards his ultimate goal of doing the most good per 
dollar.68 I argue then, that efficient spending on climate change today should be balanced, if not 
prioritized, over other social causes. 
 
Reparations 
Finally, any proposal for reparations is an incomplete anecdote to the extent and type of 
harm faced by billions of the most vulnerable. This builds off my argument on taking 
 
67 William D. Nordhaus, The Climate Casino: Risk, Uncertainty, and Economics for a Warming World (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2013). 
68 ³A Nobel PUi]e foU Whe CUeaWoU of an Economic Model ThaW UndeUeVWimaWeV Whe RiVkV of ClimaWe Change.´ 
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responsibility for the negative consequences of one¶s actions. Reparations extend to Lomborg¶s 
argument that future generations will be richer, therefore the effects of climate change will be 
less severe, informing his prioritization of modern issues. Aside from concerns about procedural 
fairness in discerning who deserves reparations, there is a deeper moral dilemma. Paying 
someone for a harm they have incurred is not morally analogous as demonstrated by the 
following thought experiments. Imagine if someone punched you in the face, without your 
permission, then simply compensated you what they think is a fair rate for the harm you have 
incurred. This does not mean they are no longer morally culpable since they violated your 
autonomy. In fact, many would see the compensation offered as offensive on top of the harm.  
This moral principle applies to climate change in several ways. First, as I will argue later, 
solutions to climate change must actually reverse the harm being caused, as opposed to simply 
paying those affected. Additionally, it shows that economically efficient outcomes, such as 
Lomborg¶s proposal for adaptation and geoengineering, are not sufficient alone. Finally, 
environmental philosophers, such as Cass Sunstein, who argue that money should simply be 
redistributed to the poor from the rich are misguided.69 This approach would not only stop 
treating countries as moral agents; it would also not hold those who have not contributed to 
climate change accountable. As I will argue in the subsequent chapter, culpability expands 
beyond those whose actions can directly be perceived, and remediation must go above monetary 
compensation. 
 
 
 
 
69 CaVV SXnVWein and EUic PoVneU, ³ClimaWe Change JXVWice,´ Law & Economics Working Papers, August 1, 2007, 
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics/107. 
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Conclusion 
The threat of climate change is real and the harms are significant. Due to the human 
caused nature of these harms, there is a special obligation to stop contributing towards climate 
change and to actively mitigate or help others adapt to the worst effects. This obligation pertains 
to warming on every scale, although the nature of the obligation correlates with shifting 
scientific evidence and growing risk of extreme tipping points. Aggressive mitigation to limit 
warming to 2 degrees today may cost more than the benefits it provides to society. However, a 
prudential limit on warming may also be the only way to stop runaway warming, where damages 
are unknown and likely to be catastrophic. Although this duty must be balanced with more 
imminent threats to human health and well-being, climate change deserves more capital and 
global attention than Lomborg allocates. I will further explore how such a duty can be carefully 
balanced for individuals and small actors in the next chapter, without being too restraining.  
A new global strategy is required, and this will incorporate elements of Lomborg¶s plan, 
however, these solutions are incomplete. As I will argue in subsequent chapters, understanding 
how to allocate the duty to combat climate change and which strategies to pursue will clarify the 
moral obligation and provide a roadmap on how to best proceed. Specifically, I will investigate 
which actors have a duty to reduce carbon emissions or go carbon neutral, looking at universities 
as specially motivated actors. While the goal of carbon neutrality may be insufficient given the 
inertia of warming that has already occurred, it is likely the full extent of what such actors may 
achieve today. This next chapter will outline why universities have a positive duty to raise 
awareness of moral catastrophes, like climate change, and a negative duty to not increase the risk 
of harm.  
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Chapter Two 
 
 
 I have argued that a duty to mitigate climate change exists, yet the next natural question 
is who has this obligation and to what extent. Although there are particular actors who have a 
magnified role in contributing to climate change, in some capacity nearly everyone has played a 
role in emitting greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. As such, this collective action problem 
has disproportionate responsibility, yet it is too large and complex to fixate merely on just the top 
emitters. As I will argue, given the urgency of this problem, even small changes can be of moral 
relevance. 
 In this chapter I will argue about the role of small actors, specifically universities, and the 
special obligations they have informed by the urgency to act, which I have subsequently argued 
for in the previous chapter. First, I argue that universities have a general positive duty to do 
good, and thus, are not exempt from their role responsibility to take action to mitigate climate 
change. This positive duty, however, is further influenced by the historical role of universities in 
social injustices. I will argue that universities are specially situated to do good and influence 
others. Furthermore, while universities exist primarily to promote truth-seeking and knowledge, 
failure to act accordingly in urgent cases, such as climate change, threatens a university¶s 
credibility.  This hypocrisy, may also erode public trust. Universities must be concerned with 
educating citizens, not just specialized workers, and to this end must set an example and provide 
integrative opportunities.   
 In addition to this positive duty, universities also have a negative duty to not cause harm 
through their emissions. In this section, I will argue that even small emissions can be morally 
relevant due to the expected utility of minor acts and moral risk. These arguments are motivated 
by the scientific gravity of the situation, as outlined in the previous chapter. As a result, 
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universities have a pro-tanto duty to take action on climate change or any other extreme social 
injustices. 
 Ultimately, this chapter will answer questions about general responsibility for small 
actors, and the specific responsibility of universities as uniquely positioned actors to spur greater 
progress. While I recognize the contributions and power of large actors in the greater picture, 
little has been written about why universities ought to take action on climate change. 
Understanding moral and practical reasons for action provides greater incentive to act and can 
motivate how universities achieve their carbon reductions. 
 
Large Actors 
 
 Looking at top emitters provides an introductory frame of reference for where to start, yet 
is an incomplete picture. Much has been written about the responsibility of developed countries 
such as the United States, China, India, and Russia which together account for approximately 
57% of global emissions.70 Other literature focuses on major corporations such as Saudi Aramco, 
Chevron, and ExxonMobil which are among the top 20 companies responsible for 35% of 
emissions since 1965.71  
On a macro-level this focus makes sense. Similar to carbon neutrality measures 
themselves, going for the largest areas of improvement promises the fastest route to meaningful 
results. Furthermore, these top countries and companies are locked in a global prisoner¶s 
dilemma. If all major actors agreed to meet the goals set out by the IPCC, then climate change 
might be a controlled speed bump, rather than a brick wall. Conversely, if each major actor 
 
70 ³Each CoXnWU\¶V ShaUe of CO2 EmiVVionV _ Union of ConceUned ScienWiVWV," 
 https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/each-countrys-share-co2-emissions. 
71 ³CaUbon MajoUV: UpdaWe of Top TZenty Companies 1965-2017,´ ClimaWe AccoXnWabiliW\ InVWiWXWe, OcWobeU 2019, 
https://climateaccountability.org/pdf/CAI%20PressRelease%20Top20%20Oct19.pdf. 
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stubbornly refused to alter their trajectory they would impair the ability of other actors to turn 
things around. Consider if every global nation decided to go carbon neutral yet China, with 29% 
of global emissions and rising, decided not to comply. Although the extent of climate change 
would be lessened due to these global efforts, China alone could still push the world over many 
global tipping points. As such, China, or any large country, can free ride off the efforts of other 
nations yet collectively everyone, including those who invested massive amounts into achieving 
carbon neutrality, still suffer. This could reduce the incentive to mitigate for other actors. Under 
such a scenario, if enough relevant actors do not take substantial action extreme warming will 
likely occur regardless of what other actors do. To the individual actor, mitigation is no longer 
incentivized, and the rational choice becomes adaptation or other methods which do not solve the 
root of this dilemma.  
Thus, major actors are important, largely responsible, and highly influential regarding our 
future. It seems, then, that the exclusive focus of climate change efforts should be how to best 
influence, pressure, or even coerce these actors into making the necessary change. For the 
individual and on a collective level, voting, protesting, or taking other measures to influence the 
big actors appears to be the best course of action. Yet, while this may be a way of achieving the 
greatest magnitude of social change, it is not mutually exclusive from the obligations of 
individual actors. In fact, while small separately, together individual behavior cumulates to about 
one third of emissions in the United States or 8% globally.72 Such individuals or organizations 
are not in a position to make the level of change alluded to earlier, yet should all their action and 
attention be focused exclusively on pushing big corporations and countries to change their 
 
72 VandenbeUgh, Michael, and Anne SWeinmann. ³The CaUbon-NeXWUal IndiYidXal.´ NYU Law Review, November 7, 
2014. https://www.nyulawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/NYULawReview-82-6-Steinemann.pdf. 
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behavior? I argue while small actors should seek to accomplish this goal, it does not excuse them 
from their own duty to reduce emissions.  
Although the public rhetoric has prioritized removing responsibility for climate change 
away from individual small actors, and focusing the spotlight on large companies, these 
companies are selling products, purchased by individual consumers. While they must be held 
accountable, I argue the obligation requires more than holding the largest perpetrators 
accountable. Specifically, I will be looking at universities as specially motivated actors who do 
not meet the threshold to make the scale of difference needed to achieve IPCC goals, yet also 
have a heightened ability to make change and influence others. 
 
The Role of Universities in Social Injustices 
 
Universities have a long and successful history of pushing for social change, often when 
government or other organizations have fallen short. In these areas, universities are what 
economists refer to as first movers. Usually the idea of first movers refers to profit seeking-
companies being the first to seize a market, thus building brand recognition, customers, and time 
to perfect their product. For social norm change, first movers often have the most to risk and 
need incentives to push them, yet will play a pivotal role in the long-term success of any novel 
initiative. 
Universities, both through student and faculty led protests and administrative action, have 
rarely strayed away from controversy in the public eye. Many students are able to use the 
credibility of their institution¶s name and expertise of professors to garner legitimate reception. 
Additionally, there are notable examples where university administrators followed the lead of 
students or started their own movement.  Looking throughout history, universities have played 
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crucial roles in bringing awareness and igniting action on several social injustices. During the 
Vietnam War, universities were especially prolific for teach ins, where students and faculty used 
freedom of speech against the war. This movement began at the University of California 
Berkeley but quickly spread across the country. Many teach ins served a dual purpose, sending a 
clear message to the government while also educating future leaders and spreading awareness. 
Historians credit these protests as being prolific in putting pressure on the US government to 
eventually leave Vietnam. 
 Decades later, students at UC Berkeley again started a far-reaching protest against 
apartheid in South Africa, successfully convincing their University to divest $3.1 billion from 
companies doing business with the apartheid government. Nelson Mandela personally credited 
the actions of UC Berkeley, among other higher education institutes, as being especially 
significant in helping abolish apartheid.73 In this example, university administrators acquiesced 
to student demands, taking on a new role where the university as a whole took a stand on a 
global injustice. This precedent was pivotal in ultimately convincing 155 universities to divest 
their own endowments, showing how the university itself could be used as a tool for fighting 
social injustice. These examples, among many others, show how universities, and students 
specifically, are willing to publicly address social issues and are often successful in turning small 
scale movements into larger action.  
Most recently, university attention has turned to climate change. In 2006 the American 
College and University Presidents¶ Climate Commitment (ACUPCC) was devised. At the time 
12 schools signed on to pledge to achieve carbon neutrality. Today almost 700 institutions have 
signed on to this pledge, representing a sizable majority of approximately 6 million students and 
 
73 ³HoZ SWXdenWV Helped End ApaUWheid,´ UniYeUViW\ of CalifoUnia, Ma\ 4, 2018, 
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growing.74 In doing so, universities have not only committed to reducing emissions, but to 
increasing education and other sustainability efforts, promoting climate change in classrooms, 
and spurring public awareness and action. 
In these examples universities fill a distinct role in society. They successfully advocated 
or took action for social causes, however, did not fit the mold of the usual think tanks, NGOs, or 
non-profit activist groups, often perceived as having an implicit agenda. Instead, universities 
took a rare departure from their role as educators of students to become political actors in 
society. It was clear through these examples that historians credit universities for playing a 
critical, yet unexpected role, in advocating for their cause. Still, the question remains, should 
universities take on such a role?   
 
Separation of Role: Objections to Political Action at Universities 
In examples, such as apartheid, one cannot deny that universities played a positive impact 
on several global injustices. Nonetheless, some argue that universities should not take any 
political position, regardless of the outcome. This argument for “distinctiveness of tasks´ seeks 
to separate the primary purpose of universities, academia, and the political stances which must be 
reserved for other groups. Proponents of this view, such as Stanley Fish, a former university 
president, argue that universities exist “not to change the world, but to interpret it´ and although 
the research produced at universities may promote real world efforts, academia should not be 
inherently designed for application.75 Fish¶s argument finds an analogy with the division of 
labor. Universities serve one primary function in society¶s assembly line, educating, and should 
 
74 ³Second NaWXUe HiVWoU\,´ hWWpV://VecondnaWXUe.oUg/hiVWoU\/. 
75 Stanley FiVh, ³Opinion _ Wh\ We BXilW Whe IYoU\ ToZeU,´ The New York Times, May 21, 2004, sec. Opinion, 
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leave separate acts, such as political action, to those best equipped. In practice, this separation 
would allow a university to analyze the pros and cons of a certain policy proposal, for example, 
but condones advocating for action on either side.  
 Opponents, argue that in cases like apartheid or climate change universities must stand 
down from making political statements. Fish acknowledges the importance of these cases, yet 
feels universities can best fulfill any obligation through knowledge sharing.76 Doing so is the 
only way to a public or private university from imposing political values on others in society. 
Instead, universities should commit solely to promoting knowledge, rather than a specific 
agenda. This aligns universities with their intended purpose in society, and prevents them from 
turning into tools for a political agenda.  
While Fish¶s argument for upholding the main purpose of a university is important, I 
disagree that universities do not have a special duty to take political action and that such action 
can harm the university¶s core mission. I argue there are certain extreme injustices, like apartheid 
or climate change, which universities must take action on. First I believe that certain  
extreme injustices do not just require a general negative duty to not contribute, which I will 
explore later, but a universal pro-tanto positive duty to alleviate suffering. Universities have 
taken action almost exclusively in such extreme cases due to their distinct nature. Furthermore, 
hypocrisy, between teaching and action, discredits the integrity of the university, and this loss of 
credibility hurts the aim of teaching. Finally, universities do not just create good students, but 
good citizens, and must act in accordance with virtues they wish to instill, while promoting 
political activism beyond graduation.  
 
76 ³The UnbeaUable ViUWXe-MongeUing of AcademicV,´ The ChUonicle of HigheU EdXcaWion, DecembeU 4, 2019, 
https://www.chronicle.com/interactives/20191204-Gutkin. 
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Fish acknowledges that almost all academic work is inherently political, which is to say 
the academic world cannot be separated from the society it studies. However, Fish draws a line 
between analyzing two academic sides of a debate and advocating action or application of what 
is taught. For many issues of little moral weight, Fish¶s argument may hold. If instead of 
focusing internally on research or curriculum a university was preoccupied with political action, 
there is a fear that this could overwhelm the intended purpose of such institutions. This 
argument, therefore, must take into account a reasonable balance. As a whole, universities are 
still predominately concerned with educating and there is no indication that the few instances 
where action has been taken is reflective of a deeper trend. Instead, such cases must be viewed as 
situations whose urgency require an obligation from all actors in society, regardless of perceived 
roles.   
Drawing such a line may seem subjective, yet universities have shown that the distinction 
is fairly clear. In fact, university administrators have only taken a collective political stance on 
small sample of issues like apartheid and recently climate change. This rarity of action should be 
interpreted as a signal of urgency; universities act out of necessity. Consider the racial violence 
of apartheid. During this chaotic time in South Africa¶s history, similar to segregation in the 
United States, black citizens faced horrendous human rights violations, were denied the right to 
vote, and protestors were arrested, killed and beaten. Overall, apartheid was a blatant moral 
catastrophe. To respond, universities, among other institutions, took action, such as divestment, 
as a calculated move to put pressure on the white supremacist regime.  
Fish argues that such action was wrong, since universities were making a political 
statement and specialize in educating, not acting. This line of reasoning is misguided for two 
reasons. First, universities were successful in advancing this endeavor, evidenced, in part, by 
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Nelson Mandala¶s personal gratitude, proving that going outside their specialization in educating 
is not a hopeless or unproductive endeavor. Secondly, in the case of extreme injustice, 
universities, have the same general positive duties to try and solve suffering as any actor would. I 
will not go into great detail about the nature of this duty, however common sense morality would 
object that in an instance of extreme suffering, such as climate change or apartheid, it is morally 
praiseworthy to take action to mitigate suffering, and morally blameworthy to turn a blind eye. In 
the rare cases that universities have taken action, I believe they have correctly judged the 
urgency and weight of the situation, and found that as actors in society they are no less culpable 
of ideally sitting by, regardless of their intended role in society. Fish argues that universities 
should be shielded from responsibility simply because doing so would shift their intended 
purpose, yet in these two examples what is at stake for universities is trivial compared to the 
gravity of the issue at hand.  
Universities are not obligated to help every political cause, doing so would be 
overwhelming and unproductive. Yet, it seems in these examples that what has been gained 
through university action is overwhelming to what might be lost. Furthermore, the singular role 
of universities, which Fish is so dedicated to maintaining, is itself flawed, as universities have 
greater potential than simply passing down academic knowledge. Overall, I have argued why 
Fish¶s argument fails due to a positive general duty to act against extreme injustices. I will now 
show how university action on these issues can help uphold the credibility of universities and 
promote better citizens.  
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Credibility and Hypocrisy 
 Throughout these examples, there is a common theme of universities being among the 
first to bring awareness or criticize human rights violations, as well as taking corresponding 
action, whenever possible, to prove their credibility. When one¶s walk doesn¶t match the talk, 
such hypocrisy sends a negative signal and can be detrimental to the ultimate aim of social 
movements. To many, a hypocrite may be even more off putting than someone who is upfront 
about their indifference. Research shows the hypocrites are despised more than an indifferent 
observer due to false signaling, deception, and an attempt to impose paternalistic measures on 
others while not upholding the same standards themselves.77  
 For universities, hypocrisy is especially objectionable because of the organization's role 
as an educator. When politicians or companies vocally raise awareness about climate change 
while simultaneously exacerbating the problem, critics are quick to point out such flaws, yet 
many cynics often know that competing interests damn such groups from the start, these are 
often simple publicity acts. Universities, however, have worked towards upholding a reputation 
for creating and promoting factual knowledge. Many universities have made significant strides in 
researching climate change as well as solutions. A large number of scientists on the IPCC panel 
come from Universities. These scientists are urging action, yet cannot install change at the very 
institution they work at. This is not to say that the credibility of scientists and the institution they 
work at should be directly related, however, in an age of denialism such a disconnect sends a 
convoluted message. Universities are sounding the alarm on climate change while remaining 
dormant and must back up their message with action if they want the rest of society to 
understand and act on the urgency of the situation.  
 
77 Jillian J. JoUdan eW al., ³Wh\ Do We HaWe H\pocUiWeV? EYidence foU a TheoU\ of FalVe Signaling,´ Psychological 
Science 28, no. 3 (March 1, 2017): 356±68, https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797616685771. 
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 Aside from just science, universities also seek to promote ethical decision making and 
critical thinking in students. Academics agree and argue that “some forms of advocacy are not 
merely permitted but positively mandated by certain fields of study.´78 To these aims, the 
credibility of the institution as a whole, of faculty, and of school leadership may be at risk if 
there is a lack of synchrony between calls for action and internal measures.  
 Social research supports the necessity of perceived ethos in professors and institutions 
through action which demonstrate good will, resulting in more trustworthy and attentive 
students.79 Although this research mainly focuses on micro-level classroom dynamics, there are 
strong parallels to how students interpret larger social issues. Consider one of several academic 
fields which incorporates climate change into the classroom. The professor would likely present 
the scientific consensus, highlighting the depth and urgency of this problem and the need to act. 
If the university is taking significant action to mitigate their own emissions, then this message, 
echoed by professors, is embodied. If, on the other hand, the university is not taking action, 
students will likely believe the science, but the gravity of taking action, making deep lifestyle 
changes or seeking alternative technologies, might be lost. The key is signaling. Students are 
acutely aware of how the institution they live in and engage with daily takes action. If the 
university signals a commitment through strong and visible action, then students are able to 
internalize the legitimacy of such calls to action.  
The idea that universities must always act in accordance with what they teach is not 
absolute. There are many situations where a certain field might promote one course of behavior, 
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yet it would be paternalistic for the university to force this on all students. A professor of 
nutrition might say from an academic standpoint that offering deserts in the dining hall is 
contrary to all scientific research. Furthermore, there are several fields where there is 
disagreement about what the correct course of action is. However, climate change does not fit 
into either of these categories. As I have argued, there is no disagreement about whether human 
action constitutes a harm, and universities are often at the forefront of publishing research on 
damage or inventing alternative technologies. When all this is front and center, it remains nearly 
impossible for a university to uphold its commitment to knowledge when such a blatant 
transgression is ignored.  
It is not the primary purpose of a university to promote social causes, yet when failure to 
do so threatens the purpose and credibility of such institutions, the necessity of action is 
heightened. Many professors may teach in unrelated fields or feel that their individual research 
of teaching can be separated from the action of the collective university. It would be bizarre if 
universities existed only to achieve carbon neutrality or other important social aims. At the same 
time, students and faculty must expect their administration to recognize urgent social dilemma 
and align action with teaching. Failure reinforces the narrative that climate change is someone 
else¶s problem or something that will magically disappear. 
 I have given several examples where expert consensus is unclear or universities are 
pushing a clear political campaign, unwarranted by the demands of justice. Given the 
unwavering scientific consensus and urgency to act, climate change is not one of these issues. 
Studies have shown that climate change educational campaigns can increase acceptance across 
the political spectrum, but it only takes a few misleading statistics to significantly lower 
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acceptance.80 Given the rise of misinformation campaigns and political polarization, universities, 
more than ever need to present a universal front for their acceptance and embodiment of the 
knowledge they promote, not just in the classroom, but outside as well.  
Taking action in-line with what is being taught in the classroom is one condition for 
upholding credibility, but this must strike a reasonable balance with manageable goals. The 
hypocrite label is often used as an ad-hominem attack against many of the most prominent 
climate change activists. While these organizations or individuals may try their best to minimize 
their emissions when travelling or eating, eventually, often due to the carbon intensive nature of 
our society, they resort to some form of carbon emitting activity. Many of these individuals are 
doing the most to spread awareness about climate change, it seems they may be trapped by the 
limitations of society which they are protesting against. Thus, the hypocrisy fear has an upper 
bound. If an individual or organization wishes to truly commit to an issue, it must take 
corresponding action to signal rigidity and unwavering support for this cause. However, climate 
change presents certain challenges, which I will address in more detail, where even wholehearted 
efforts to go carbon neutral are restrained by technological advancements. Renewable energy, for 
example, only recently became economically efficient and battery storage still has a long way to 
go.  
Thus, universities must be seen as taking real tangible efforts to reduce their emissions, 
while at the same time the idea of putting these institutions under a microscope must be 
discouraged, as it ignores holistic considerations. Anytime an advocate speaks out on a social 
issue, they invite the public spotlight. Most, if not all, academic institutions publish or promote 
climate change research. From an outsider perspective, if the same organization which publishes 
 
80 Michael AndUeZ Ranne\ and DaY ClaUk, ³ClimaWe Change ConcepWXal Change: ScienWific InfoUmaWion Can 
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scientific reports on the damages of climate change does not view these same reports as evidence 
to change their own behavior, this likely affects how such articles are perceived and acted upon. 
As a result, universities must take meaningful steps to reduce their emissions, and this action 
should be highly visible. However, as a small actor, their obligation to reduce emissions is not 
absolute, and while ambitious goals should be encouraged, it must be considered among other 
ways universities can make a difference.  
 
Installing Civic Virtues: Beyond Knowledge 
 
 The final reason universities should take political action for extreme injustices is to set a 
positive example, not just as an educator, but as an institution that can help foster better citizens. 
Through both intended and inadvertent aspects of higher education, universities promote certain 
behaviors that reflect general qualities society values. I argue that universities have and should 
continue to make the intrinsic value of higher education more transparent, and take active steps 
to encourage better citizenship, including civil engagement. To this aim, the university itself 
must provide opportunities to practice and role-model these behaviors, both in and out of the 
classroom. Academia should not impose a barrier between the work of professors and students 
and the real world impact. While removing this barrier opens up a door for political bias, this 
encourages students and faculty to debate and think about the stakes of their work. Failure to 
take action on social issues sends a negative signal to students and neglects an opportunity to 
teach and apply good civic behavior. 
For most of higher education¶s history the focus has been two main aims, the 
instrumental purpose of entering the labor market and the intrinsic goal of helping students make 
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autonomous choices to determine a life worth living.81  Although both are valued, lately, with the 
rising costs of higher education, students are demanding more ways they can see a monetary 
return on their large investment, often at the cost of the intrinsic value of higher education. Many 
universities are actively responding through career services programs and networking events. 
While many students see this as the primary reason for attending university, this end goal does 
not interfere with nor discourage what universities can accomplish in the interim.82 Universities 
have the opportunity to help students shape their own habits and worldviews, providing active 
participants in society that keep democracy functioning. 
Whether intentional or not, many young adolescents are transformed by their years at 
university and credit their institution for helping them find meaning and answers questions about 
what kind of life they wish to live. Although universities were not set up for this role, it seems 
they have inherited it due a lack of other institutions in a democratic society. While democracy 
requires engaged and active participants, no formal institution has been set up for this exclusive 
purpose. Instead, universities have found themselves as a last buffer between the bubble of 
education and the real world, and thus have accepted a responsibility to promote the 
characteristics of good citizens in a democracy. In this aim, universities seem to serve as an 
unbiased guide, laying out potential paths for students to follow, yet at its core this nudging 
cannot avoid a notion of right and wrong. 
While universities encourage students to find meaning and purpose, there is an inherent 
political nature to promoting good citizenship, which is how to define good citizenship. Many 
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virtues of good citizenship can be taught by universities without bias. Universities pride 
themselves on improving critical thinking skills, communication and public speaking, and levels 
of empathy among other measures that reflect good citizenship. While doing so in a classroom 
setting may be one way of achieving such goals, educators and students have both found that 
applying these skills is the best way to practice and appreciate them. In an effort to encourage 
application, universities have increasingly promoted community-based learning, volunteering 
opportunities, and speakers on a range of important topics. These methods not only appeal to 
students, as they take such concepts out of the passive world of academia, but they have high 
success rates. Studies find that even with selection effects, students who participated in the 
aforementioned “high-impact experiences´ displayed a more active role in applying knowledge 
and participating in political issues during and beyond their time in higher education.83 
Although universities can create productive and connected citizens, should they if doing 
so risks taking a political stance? I have argued that universities must do so when they are 
morally required to act in cases of extreme injustices, however, I also believe that universities 
should promote political activism for intrinsic reasons and to produce better citizens. 
 First, universities should resist the aimless pursuit of objectivity as taking no stance on an 
issue serves to promote the status quo. Recognizing the futility of trying to be neutral in a 
political world, universities must recognize what can be gained by promoting activism. Failure to 
do so discourages professors and students from thinking about the real world implications of 
their work. On a student level, the disconnect would be even more backwards. Universities 
avoiding political action aim to educate students on civic activism, yet deny students the perfect 
opportunity to practice in a low stakes setting.  
 
83 Andrew J. Perrin and Alanna GilliV, ³HoZ College MakeV CiWi]enV: HigheU EdXcaWion E[peUienceV and PoliWical 
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 Translating these arguments into concrete action, universities should focus on three main 
goals. First universities should allow and encourage students to promote whichever social cause 
fits their passion, and provide resources to allow them to practice civic engagement. Secondly, 
faculty should not be prevented from expressing political opinions and should remain connected 
with the ramifications of their work on society and students. Finally, on an administrative level, 
universities may also take political action for student led initiative or severe injustices. In 
allowing for active debates, universities promote the skills that a democratic society will require 
and encourage action over complacency. 
 Issues like climate change highlight this opportunity. Students, faculty, and 
administrators recognize climate change as a crucial problem current and subsequent generations 
will need to grapple with. Students will not just need to know the science behind climate change, 
as active citizens they will be expected to deal with the political fallout. While university 
presidents proactively signed agreements to go carbon neutral, they knew the efforts to achieve 
these measures would require heavy student involvement. Installing virtues of sustainability 
while allowing students to practice civil activism fits a progressive model of higher education 
that encourages students to take academic debates outside of the classroom. Universities serve an 
important role in our democratic society, and the increasing shift towards public displays of 
activism should be encouraged for its consequential and intrinsic value. Not only will academia 
realize the potential for applying knowledge outside the ivory tower, but students will continue 
to embody political activism and engaged citizenship.  
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Negative Duties and Small Risks: Expected Value in Times of Moral Urgency 
Aside from signaling and maintaining credibility the question remains, should 
universities reduce their emissions for intrinsic moral reasons? The arguments I have presented 
have been for a positive duty, which is less demanding. Furthermore, many of these efforts bring 
a positive spotlight on universities, which could create misguided incentives to act. Universities 
often take on praiseworthy social goals, but if this is to merely uphold their credibility or move 
up on a ranking, such behavior is gilded. Fortunately, many university presidents have taken the 
task of carbon reductions seriously. Although tracking cumulative emissions is a messy process 
and numbers are not exact, an estimate from 2005 predicted that U.S. institutions for higher 
education made up 2% of domestic emissions.84 This number puts universities in a prolific spot. 
Together they are influential enough to garner attention. At the same time, their cumulative 
efforts will ultimately be trumped by what government and large carbon intensive companies 
decide to do.  
On a micro level the question remains, are the emissions of one small college within this 
large system significant? Answering this question opens up the debate on small chances, morally 
acceptable risk, threshold levels, and how taking action can create a domino effect to spur larger 
cumulative change. I will argue how seemingly small effects on individual small actors, whether 
one student, a small liberal arts college, or larger universities, can be morally relevant. This duty 
is critical, but not absolute, and I use pro tanto language to define the obligation. This will take 
into account the difficulties in measuring the full effects of small acts and the levels of risk we 
view as morally acceptable in society today, as well as agent-relative relations, technological 
limitations, and equity concerns. This duty may not be steadfast, but superfluous emissions must 
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not be viewed in accordance with everyday morality. Without an upper-bound, such acts 
unethically increase the risk of harm and deprive the least advantaged from their fair share.  
 
Acceptable Levels of Risk 
Every day we make choices that involve risk or uncertainty. The act of driving a car 
provides some insight into this spectrum of moral risk. Driving a car is one of the most 
dangerous activities we engage in and is a leading cause of death in the US and several other 
countries, yet many treat this activity with casual regard. While driving is by itself a hazardous 
activity, most of the harm that results from accidents is limited to those who consent to facing 
these risks, by entering a highway for instance. However, on the highway there are limits on 
acceptable levels of risk for consenting participants. Consider speed limits. While not perfect, 
they are imposed to put an upper bound on speed following the logic that when one is driving 
faster, they have less time to react or are more likely to lose control. If one is caught speeding 
there are, of course, legal ramifications, however, speeding is rarely seen as an inherently 
immoral act. This is because speed limits are often see as too conservative. Many drive at least 
slightly above the speed limit and statistically such behavior does not contribute to accidents in a 
highly discernable or public degree.  
Distracted driving shows how the spectrum shifts as one engages in riskier behavior. 
Although relatively new, there is good evidence that distracted driving is significantly more 
hazardous than speeding. Thus, when one is caught driving while texting, they not only face 
legal ramifications, many may also condone such behavior on a moral level. Looking away from 
the road puts the individual, passengers, and others on the road in greater danger and shows a 
lack of regard for safety.  
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Finally, intoxicated driving is seen as one of the worst violations one can commit on the 
road. The level of risk is so high that if one is able to drive home without causing an accident it is 
seen as a near miracle. Furthermore, there doesn¶t have to be a victim of drunk driving for 
society to view it as morally wrong since the individual was willing to impose such reckless 
actions on themselves and innocent bystanders. Not only is drunk driving punished with the 
highest penalties in our legal system, those who take on such risk are acting immorally, 
regardless if someone is actually harmed as a result of their actions. 
Throughout these illustrations, I have shown how varying degrees of risk reveal how we 
translate relatively abstract percentages into moral judgements. Many do not need to see actual 
statistics on the aforementioned behaviors, they simply have a gut reaction regarding the 
morality of such acts. In the previous examples how one drives the car is seen as a moral 
question, yet the act of driving the car is rarely viewed with the same critique. Although 
individuals know the fossil fuels they put into their car emit greenhouse gases, rarely does one 
scrutinize such behavior with the intensity of distracted or intoxicated driving. I argue this 
disconnect, although understandable, is morally misguided. One study roughly estimated that the 
emissions of the average American is at least responsible for the suffering and/or deaths of at 
least two future people.85 Given the moral urgency of climate change, outlined in the first chapter 
of my thesis, if the science is to be taken at face value, then the moral risk of emissions is high, 
possibly akin to distracted or drunk driving. 
While it is clear that for large actors their emissions have a much higher probability of 
causing a bad outcome, I argue small actors are not exempt of responsibility. This is due to 
expected utility calculations which, simply put, multiplies the chance that something bad 
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happens by how bad it would be. In regards to climate change, there are two relevant expected 
utility calculations which show why relatively small actors, such as universities or individuals, 
would not be taking sufficient precaution through reckless emissions. The first is in the climate 
system itself and the second involves market mechanisms. 
 As I have argued, greenhouse gases create instability in the climate, creating new 
weather conditions that are overwhelmingly negative. Within the climate system there are 
several thresholds for change. Some of these thresholds involve positive feedback loops. Others 
may involve the extra degree of warming that intensifies a hurricane or expedites thermal 
expansion which floods a village. A rational actor must acknowledge that if any of these events 
were to occur, the results would be so catastrophic that all prudent precautions should be taken to 
prevent this outcome. The rational actor, however, does not know exactly what level of 
emissions are sufficient to cause these harms. They do know that for each additional emission of 
greenhouse gas there is zero probability that the carbon or methane released can do no good or 
harm. The scientific evidence points that emissions past a certain are overwhelmingly likely to 
cause harm, and we are moving dangerously past that threshold. When one engages in 
superfluous emissions there is an expectation of harm, even if it is not visible. Thus, given the 
instability of the climate and the extreme harms of global warming, expected utility holds we 
should reduce emissions across the board. 
Additionally, further expected utility calculations show how individual acts may turn into 
larger effects. Building off of Peter Singer¶s argument for vegetarianism, while supply does not 
always respond exactly to consumer demand, there are certain thresholds. Consider airplane 
travel, an activity which emits some of the highest levels of GHGs. One might argue that 
regardless of what they do, the airplane will take off either way. Yet, consider if that plane is full 
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and your ticket purchase incentivizes the airline to operate an additional flight. Then your 
personal footprint would be exponentially higher. Again, this is not absolute, but even a slim 
probability of such an event, given what is at stake, is of great moral weight.  
Even though individuals contribute towards this tragedy of the commons, some 
philosophers feel the individual contribution is too minute to be of moral significance, even 
given the catastrophic harm. Walter-Sinnott Armstrong is one such philosopher who famously 
argued that one¶s individual contributions play no part in warming the atmosphere and one 
should not feel responsible to reduce luxury emissions, such as a Sunday drive.86 One thought 
experiment involves four individuals pushing a car off a cliff. In such a case, the car is 
sufficiently heavy that it requires four individuals to move it, yet no more. Armstrong argues that 
one¶s individual emissions are like an additional person pushing the car, neither necessary nor 
sufficient for the harm, the car falling off the cliff, to occur.  
 I argue Armstrong commits two errors in such an argument, ignoring small acts and 
chances. First, climate change, unlike pushing a car off a cliff is not a “one and done event´. In 
Armstrong¶s example there are only two outcomes that can occur, the car is pushed off the cliff 
or the car is not pushed off the cliff. Unfortunately, for climate change there are what 
philosopher Ben Almassi refers to as “rungs on a climatological ladder.´87 As such, the degrees 
of harm are morally relevant. A little bit more warming may not seem catastrophic, but the real 
world implications could entail additional deaths.  
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This argument builds off Derik Parfit¶s Mistakes in Moral Mathematics.88 Parfit¶s first 
argument uses a thought experiment of 1,000 torturers and 1,000 victims. In the first scenario, 
each torturer tortures one victim, slowly increasing the level of pain from unnoticeable to 
discernable to unbearable, until the victim is clearly being tortured. However, in the second 
example, each torturer is torturing a different victim, meaning each individual push of a button 
cannot be directly linked to making one individual suffer more. In the end, the outcome is the 
same, yet the two scenarios seem morally different. Armstrong argues that in the latter case no 
torturer harms any individual, yet in the end 1,000 innocent individuals are tortured. 
 This mistake is also morally relevant for Armstrong¶s appeal that small actors can deflect 
guilt onto large actors. In such a thought experiment, it takes 1,000 pushes of the button for the 
individual to be tortured. Large actors have already pushed the button 900 times. Although they 
have disproportionate responsibility, one individual¶s action is separate. You know that pushing 
the button, after it has been pushed 900 times, will play a much more significant role expediting 
the harm to the individual. Furthermore, there is no evidence the large actors will stop pushing 
their button or are able to reverse their pushes anytime soon. While your press of the button or 
your emissions are small, given the current level of carbon in the atmosphere, the aggregate 
effect of each individual¶s actions constitutes an immoral conclusion. Just like with emissions, 
the first hundred or so emissions do not cause any real harm, it is only when a sufficient number 
of actors contribute. Thus, each action must be seen as dependent on the actions of others. A 
Sunday drive in isolation is not morally objectionable, but given the levels of GHGs in the 
atmosphere and signs that such warming is only increasing, the scenario changes. Given this, the 
common sense morality Armstrong proposes no longer applies to collective harm. 
 
88 Derek Parfit, Five Mistakes in Moral Mathematics, Reasons and Persons (Oxford University Press), 
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In addition to these small effects, Armstrong also disagrees with Parfit¶s argument for 
small chances. As I have argued, moral risks exist on a spectrum and must be evaluated 
carefully. There are no calculations or numbers that can accurately ascertain exactly how risky 
one drive or flight is and what the expected utility of each act is. Nonetheless, Parfit offers some 
guiding principles that can help make sense of drawing a line. Ignoring small chances when the 
stakes are incredibly high or when an action will be repeated many times are two criteria which 
call for a greater sense of urgency. Parfit offers the case of a nuclear power plant. A one in a 
million chance of failure may seem sufficient for something benign, however, in the case of a 
nuclear power plant thousands or millions of lives could be at stake. As the plant is running 
every day, these constant iterations only increase the chance of catastrophe.  
In response, Armstrong might argue that such a low tolerance for risk would be too 
restrictive on daily life, paralyzing many essential functions. This argument is similar to the fear 
of too low a discount rate, and must be balanced accordingly. There are countless risks which a 
similar argument could be made for. Consider banning the use of computers out of a fear of 
future AI development or stopping all antibiotic prescriptions to prevent a superbug. If an alien 
species could come to our planet and easily destroy us all, why not invest significantly in space 
defense? These thought experiments get at the slippery slope of how too much risk aversion may 
be overbearing or take away resources from more important causes. In response, I simply assert 
that the science surrounding climate change, outlined in chapter 1, presents overwhelming 
evidence to support the damages that will arise if nothing is done and other risks do not have this 
evidence. Furthermore, the different thresholds in the climate system and increasing stream of 
emissions only heightens this moral risk. As a result, efforts to reduce even small levels of 
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emissions are not alarmist, and such a duty does exist, although defining this duty reveals the 
opposing obligations that must be weighed. 
 
Specifying the Nature of the Obligation 
Given my argument that a duty exists, there still remains the larger question on how to 
turn abstract levels of risk into concrete moral duties while not unnecessarily restricting 
autonomy or causing more harm in the process. Throughout this paper I have tried to strike a 
delicate balance between extreme viewpoints, however, there are morally relevant reasons to 
push back against too strong a duty to mitigate individual emissions. Given a low enough 
discount rate and sufficiently high damages, one could use an expected utility calculation to 
argue that everyone should cut their emissions to the bare minimum to survive. Peter Singer 
seems to make such an argument, taking a hard utilitarian stance that what is lost is trivial to the 
net gain for those most disadvantaged today.89 I object to this notion of a perfect negative duty 
and instead argue there are pluralistic considerations that must be considered.  
First, individuals have what Sam Scheffler refers to as “agent-centered prerogatives´ to 
pursue private concerns rather than maximizing overall utility. This is not to say that individuals 
should actively try to not maximize overall utility, but that there are permissions to not do the 
best, or even to allow harm to others, in accordance with commonsense morality. Consider an 
example where one is on their way to perform CPR on a dying close friend. Along the way they 
pass someone drowning. They can only save one individual and the other is guaranteed to die if 
this person does not save them. In such a case, one¶s spatial position seems less relevant than the 
value of their friendship. If one thought otherwise, then a friend or family member dying would 
 
89 ³Famine, AfflXence, and MoUaliW\, b\ PeWeU SingeU,´ hWWpV://ZZZ.XWiliWaUian.neW/VingeU/b\/1972.hWm. 
 62 
be no different than the death of any random individual. Derik Parfit expands upon this 
distinction by delineating between agent-neutral reasons to alleviate suffering, which are 
objective reasons for everyone, and agent-relative reasons which cannot exist for other agents.90 
The intrinsic value of these relationships provide strong person-affecting reasons to deny the 
cold calculus of pure utilitarianism. 
As a result of pluralistic considerations, I call for a pro tanto obligation which allows for 
the weight of other obligations to be balanced. There are several ways one imposes risks on 
others through their emissions, yet denying them this right would cause unjust harm to that 
individual or jeopardize their personal relationships. Just as we do not expect everyone to pursue 
careers that maximize utility for society or donate all surplus income to charity, the 
demandingness of emissions reductions must be proportionate to the level of sacrifice required. 
This balance, however, is not a blank check to use agent-relative or self-motivated reasons as an 
excuse to contribute to climate change.  
Proportionate emissions reductions provide general guiding principles for delineating 
between emissions for sustaining everyday life and luxury emissions which impose unnecessary 
risks without moral justification. Armstrong argues for extreme “black and white´ examples, 
such as boiling a pot of water to argue how many relatively innocuous and essential every day 
activities are at stake. As Armstrong points out our economy is highly dependent on carbon and 
many functions, such as hospitals or keeping medicine cold, could be at risk. Furthermore, 
technological development has offered some, but not many, alternatives to everyday activities 
that omit GHGs, many of which are vital to sustaining life. Such “necessity´ examples highlight 
a clear allowance for an individual to emit.  
 
90 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Reasons and Persons (Oxford University Press), 
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Still, there is a large moral grey area where the line between essential and luxury, while 
accounting for personal prerogatives, is blurred. It seems obvious that flying on a private plane is 
excessive by any measure, yet does this nullify flying commercial, likely the highest GHG 
activity for the average individual, to visit a sick relative? Some philosophers argue these 
subjective questions can only be answered by individuals themselves, building off Kant¶s 
definition of imperfect duties.91 In such instances, only the individual has all the relevant 
information to make such a decision, although this does not permit unrestrained access. 
Given the apparent difficulties in weighing conflicting duties and freedoms, I roughly 
endorse the philosophy behind Steve Vanderheiden¶s proposal, arguing that everyone should be 
able to emit what is needed to ensure subsistence, while luxury emissions should be distributed 
on a per capita basis, taking into account the needs of special groups. While this theoretical 
concept may not work perfectly in application, it supports the underlying argument that 
superfluous emissions have more to do with equity and depriving others of their share, than 
unjustly increasing the risk of harm to others.   
Baylor Johnson argues that in tragedies of the commons, like climate change, one¶s 
individual behavior does always constitute a harm, but rather overuse, which can be harmful, but 
is not always.92 Thus, the stronger objection to Johnson¶s view is not that superfluous luxury 
emissions will harm “X´ more individuals, but that it will unjustly deprive “X´ more from their 
fair share of emissions, which they also have self-motivated and person-affecting reasons to 
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pursue.93 So, to answer Armstrong¶s question, taking a joyride in an inefficient SUV may be 
permissible, as long as one stays below their overall cap.  
This still leaves questions on defining the cap and determining what behaviors are 
essential for different individuals. Likely a “western lifestyle´ would require a deep-rooted 
transformation, but this obligation will depend heavily on financial and social circumstances, as 
well as technological limitations. Building off the ethical principal that “ought implies can,´ 
“can´ will depend heavily on these factors. Many actors, like universities, will be in much more 
capable positions to keep luxury emissions to a minimum, and will have less justification to not 
make such reductions. Thus, a notion of a cap, while not perfect or absolute, reflects the scarcity 
of emissions and is a move towards more individual responsibility when circumstances allow.  
Finally, building off Lomborg¶s argument to not ignore the opportunity cost of inefficient 
efforts, not all mitigation actions are equal. Likely, a notion of scarcity will push actors towards 
efficient ways of reducing their carbon footprint, prioritizing “low-hanging fruit´ or solutions 
that maximize the ROI, which I will explore in my next chapter. Examples of these include 
energy efficiency measures, switching to renewable energy, and even eating plant based meat as 
it becomes less distinguishable from methane intensive red meat. As I will explore, many of 
these measure also save the individual money. In such cases, where the tradeoffs are low and the 
risks of harm and gluttony are high, there is little moral justification to not seek out “win-win´ 
alternatives. 
 In my previous chapter I have argued there is a duty to take action on climate change, 
but this duty is also not immune from well-intended concerns that it may grow too absolute. 
Preventing a world of runaway warming promises large benefits to society that I argue outweigh 
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the costs, but this marginal benefit decreases with limiting warming to 2° C, 1.5° C, or even less. 
Many of the solutions required to fully abate these warming scenarios will not be easy solutions, 
but will involve technologies that have not reached economies of scale. An investment in solar 
panels 10 years ago would have taken money away from R&D or other important carbon 
neutrality efforts, while the same investment today would actually save money on energy costs. 
While I have presented a skeptical approach to CBA for selecting global efforts to pursue, there 
are strong reasons to rely on CBA for efficient solutions. Offsets provide one avenue today, 
which I will address in my next chapter, but after a certain point efforts to reduce “high-hanging 
fruit´ present a costly stretch. 
 Armstrong and Johnson have argued that an individual actor should try to lobby the 
government to ban carbon emitting behaviors while still enjoying them. This argument fails to 
take seriously the perils and failures of government as well as the urgency of the situation. 
Furthermore, there¶s a strange contradiction in working for a collective solution, while ignoring 
one¶s internal duty. I argue activism and action are not mutually exclusive, and while there are 
several contradicting duties I have considered, those capable have a responsibility to reduce their 
share of superfluous emissions, to limit risk and not overindulge in a limited resource. Progress 
on a larger scale is laudable, but it does not excuse the individual actor from their negative duty. 
 
Stigma 
 A final relevant point about morally contentious activities is the role of stigma and 
convenience. This section seeks to contextualize why certain unethical behaviors can become 
commonplace and give insights that will motivate how university action can create new moral 
norms, which I will explore in depth in my next chapter. While not absolute, many morally 
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egregious behaviors from humanity¶s past were not stigmatized as such, often due to the 
convenience of such behaviors, or simply there was too much to gain that ignoring moral 
questions became common place and easy. This builds off Alexander Guerrero who argues that 
in cases of moral ignorance it is better to act prudently.94 One example Guerrero gives is past 
uncertainty on whether owning slaves was wrong. Many individuals in past centuries may have 
claimed to be ignorant on whether slavery was morally wrong. Guerrero argues that in such cases 
the stakes were sufficiently high that one had a clear obligation to discover the truth.  
I think Guerrero¶s argument has parallels to climate change in several ways. Not only has 
climate change reached the scientific urgency that all actors have an obligation to become 
educated on the facts and risks of their individual action, there is also a similarity in how 
convenience clouds moral judgement. Behaviors were not stigmatized due to conflicting 
incentives, however, we now look back on what was gained as trivial to the moral catastrophe 
that was allowed to continue. In the future, there is a high probability that our actions today will 
be stigmatized with the same disdain.  
 Climate change is of particular moral danger due to its hidden nature. When emissions 
come out of a car or plane or factory, they are not visible. The effects of climate change, as well, 
are hard to grasp. The most vulnerable, those residing in third world countries and future 
generations, are also not visible to those most responsible for emissions. Furthermore, the 
advantages of ignoring such effects are clear. Carbon is imbedded into almost every aspect of our 
economy and everyday life. Any call for a radical and quick transition would require immense 
effort and sacrifice. These difficulties, and past failures, point to a moral dilemma, one that is 
relevant to actors large and small. Armstrong may be concerned only about the former, however, 
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given past miscalculations, the potential urgency of the situation requires effort from all who 
play a contributing role. 
 
Influencing Others: An Imperfect Positive Duty 
 Finally, small actors, such as universities, should take action to reduce emissions to 
motivate other actors. This argument expands upon the influence of small actors beyond what 
Armstrong believes is possible. Armstrong argues “people like to see themselves a more 
influential than they really are.´ While for some individuals this may hold true, I have argued 
universities are especially positioned to create change, using historical examples and highlighting 
their role as educators for activism in democracy. I will now present a moral justification for 
such action, which expands upon the concept of reducing the overall risk of climate change, 
using one¶s negative duty to spur a greater change in stigma and corresponding action. This 
argument will extend into my next chapter which goes into greater depth about the “why´ and 
“how´ of such norm change. The creation of social norms has higher consequential value due to 
the potential to spur larger scale change. Since this is a positive duty, actors are not expected to 
uphold an unlimited expectation to maximize utility. Nonetheless, they can take effective steps 
for relatively small costs. Throughout this chapter I have shown how universities are perfectly 
situated for this role, I will now argue why they should take steps to expand upon their impact 
within the bounds of their position in society.   
We like to think that as humans we make each decision in our daily life autonomously; 
however, this is not always true. As creatures of social habit, we tend to follow the crowd, 
looking for norms or behavior to fit in or model. Consider the famous Asch line experiment 
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which sought to demonstrate the influence of social pressure on our decision making ability.95 
Participants were asked which line out of three best matched the height of a fourth line showed 
parallel. Two of the three lines were clearly taller or shorter with only one being the correct 
height. In fact, researchers expected a 100% response rate. In the experiment, however, 
researchers placed actors in control groups who would purposely give blatantly wrong answers 
aloud before an unsuspecting subject gave their answer. In such groups, a surprising 75% of 
subjects gave at least one incorrect answer. When asked why these choose an answer that 
conflicted with their intuition, many subjects admitted to simply “going along with the crowd´. 
This experiment, among many in psychology, gives some insight into the inner-workings of 
decision making and social change, which can be of moral relevance for motivating small actors. 
I have argued for a negative duty for actors, such as universities, to refrain from harming 
others, but there is an additional positive duty to produce desirable outcomes, in this case 
motivating a larger pool of actors to take corresponding action. Striving for carbon neutrality is 
not an isolated act. It is often very public and has an effect on those made aware of it. This 
spillover or domino effect can encourage, alarm, or shame other actors who then take action. 
Many see action as proof of the scientific urgency, other may feel they are not pulling their 
weight, and some may simply follow in the steps of first-movers to keep up with the masses. On 
the other hand, not taking steps to reduce emissions is interpreted as preservation of the status-
quo, in this case passively agreeing that continuous emissions are morally acceptable even when 
the science is clear that such practices are not sustainable.  
Rather than a responsibility to avoid harm, the responsibility to promote good, while less 
strict, is still of great moral weight. Universities are well-suited for the tasks of promoting 
 
95 Solomon E. AVch, ³OpinionV and Social PUeVVXUe,´ Scientific American 193, no. 5 (November 1955): 31±35, 
https://doi.org/10.1038/scientificamerican1155-31. 
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scientific knowledge, creating good citizens, and standing up to global injustices. n Imany cases 
they are expected to fill this role in society and include doing so as part of their mission. These 
roles fit with the positive duty of promoting sustainable behavior as a new social norm. 
Furthermore, the costs associated with achieving carbon neutrality are the highest, which paves 
the way for norm activation. Universities have taken on the ambitious goal of carbon neutrality 
for intrinsic and consequential reasons, but it would be counterintuitive to not work towards 
motivating other actors to follow aspects of the behavior they model, when the costs of achieving 
norm buy-in are relatively low and the payoffs can be exponential.  
Opponents like Armstrong simply assert that individuals or even organizations are not 
influential, thus any action taken will not cause any snowball effect. While I will refute this 
claim with more evidence in my next chapter, this conclusion seems highly improbable. Even if 
we are not greatly influential, any influence is of moral relevance in the expected utility 
calculations. Consider a petition that needs 10,000 signatures to pass. If passed, the petition 
would save 100 lives. A supporter can simply sign the petition or sign and share it with friends or 
post it online. Since one does not know how others will act, taking action which increases the 
chance of a good outcome is morally praiseworthy. One signature or one actor reducing 
emissions is not always highly visible, but how such behavior influences others can be. The 
effect of this spillover, iterated enough times, cannot be underestimated and provides a final 
justification for the efforts of universities, large and small.  
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have argued why universities, as relatively small but specially motivated 
actors, should take action to reduce emissions. I have argued for some practical reasons, such as 
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maintaining credibility and inspiring active citizens in democracy, as well as moral reasons, 
including both positive and negative duties. In the next chapter, I will look further into social 
change and how universities can leverage their position to spur a much larger impact, influencing 
a wide array of actors to reduce emissions or strive for carbon neutrality. While this may produce 
more visible results, I still believe the intrinsic reasons for reducing emissions hold. Armstrong 
argues one should prioritize social activism over individual action. Universities must advance 
both, raising awareness on climate change, encouraging student activism, and redefining moral 
expectations, all while walking the walk.   
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Chapter 3 
 
 I have argued for morally relevant reasons to combat climate change, even for seemingly 
small actors. Contributing to larger social change is one motivating factor for such action. In this 
chapter I will explore the research supporting this claim, arguing how universities can serve as 
first movers and create a larger domino effect. First, I will examine the social science 
surrounding norm change, both to understand the power of cultural norms in society and 
highlight best practices to create new norms and disrupt old ones. This type of implicit 
behavioral change will be most prolific for those closely connected to universities, including 
students, faculty, and local governance. The second potential for universities is to use their 
position as first movers to influence large actors, such as big corporations or organizations. 
Universities, many of which were the first to undertake this ambitious goal, can provide a 
roadmap for achieving carbon neutrality, collaborating to share knowledge and best practices. 
These paths, while different in nature, provide two avenues for universities to turn their 
individual contribution into much greater social change.  
 
Introducing Social Norms 
 As humans we like to fit in with the crowd. The line experiment alluded to in the 
previous chapter is one clear demonstration of how far our behavior can be influenced. Social 
norms are rules largely understood by a group used for dictating human behavior without laws.96 
These norms, while not absolute, create a range of acceptable or “normal´ behaviors. Such 
 
96 Robert B. Cialdini and Melanie R. Trost, ³Social InflXence: Social NoUmV, ConfoUmiW\ and Compliance,´ in The 
Handbook of Social Psychology, Vols. 1-2, 4th Ed (New York, NY, US: McGraw-Hill, 1998), 151±92. 
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norms funnel and scaffold our behavior, guiding lifestyle choices and creating new incentives to 
take action that might otherwise be neglected.97  
Like the line experiment, no one wants to be the odd one out. Furthermore, if a sufficient 
group is acting a certain way, their strength in numbers serves as reinforcement that it is the 
correct way to act. In fact, creating social pressure is more effective at changing behavior than 
educational campaigns or telling people how to act. One study on reducing energy consumption 
measured the effect of different persuasion methods including environmental benefit, benefit for 
society, financial benefit, and social influence.98 Although subjects in the experiment felt social 
influence had the least effect on their consumption, the study found that normative social 
influence yielded the greatest change in behavior. Another study tried two different methods to 
encourage towel reuse at a hotel.99 The first message encouraged guests to help save the 
environment, while the second read “Join your fellow guests in helping to save the environment. 
Almost 75% of guests reuse their towels during their stay.´ Researchers saw a 26% increase in 
towel reuse with the second message. Guests don¶t like being told what to do, but the social 
pressure of what others are doing can be highly influential.  
 Given the promising research on the influence of social norms, universities are in a 
perfect position to start a new norm, changing trends and influencing individual behavior. 
Although there are several challenges, inherent to both universities and sustainability, with 
strong leadership and strategic vision they can be overcome. In this section, I will outline the 
research explaining why social norms are powerful in motivating behavioral change and how 
 
97 Saadi Lahlou, Installation Theory: The Societal Construction and Regulation of Behaviour, 1st ed. (Cambridge 
University Press, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316480922. 
98 JeVVica M. Nolan eW al., ³NoUmaWiYe Social InflXence IV UndeUdeWecWed:,´ Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, May 9, 2008, https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167208316691. 
99 Noah J. GoldVWein, RobeUW B. Cialdini, and VladaV GUiVkeYiciXV, ³A Room ZiWh a VieZpoinW: UVing Social NoUmV 
Wo MoWiYaWe EnYiUonmenWal ConVeUYaWion in HoWelV,´ Journal of Consumer Research 35, no. 3 (October 1, 2008): 
472±82, https://doi.org/10.1086/586910. 
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first movers, like universities, can use this research to turn their own carbon neutrality efforts 
into an effective tool for demand intervention, both inside and outside the academic setting.  
 
Descriptive Norms 
 Research on social norms commonly breaks up norms into two main categories, 
descriptive and injunctive norms. Descriptive norms refer to what is commonly done by others. 
This is similar to the towel or line experiment where participants engage in a certain activity 
simply because they see others around them doing the same thing. Social researchers point to 
several motivations for descriptive norms. One is that individuals simply don¶t want to stand out 
or ostracize themselves by dissenting from the general opinion. This desire to fit in pushes 
individuals to conform to the masses even if doing so is contrary to what they might otherwise 
do. Fitting in is incentivized by praise and shame, although descriptive norms rely more heavily 
on the latter. While fitting in is rarely praised, those who do not conform to norms clearly stand 
out. Cristina Bicchieri gives the example of social greetings, where conforming goes unnoticed 
but defecting is interpreted as rude and hostile.100  Finally, individuals rely on descriptive norms, 
even arbitrary ones, to inform decision making.101 Making decisions often involves knowing all 
the relevant facts, rarely an easy task. Relying on a large sample size gives legitimacy to a 
decision and offers an insurance policy on otherwise risk decisions. Rather than having to weigh 
all the pros and cons, one can simply follow the crowd, assuming that the leader took the time to 
deliberate such considerations and the strength of followers reinforces this logic. 
 
 
100 Bicchieri, Cristina. Norms in the Wild: How to Diagnose, Measure, and Change Social Norms. Oxford 
University Press, 2017. 
101 ³EYen AUbiWUaU\ NoUmV InflXence MoUal Decision-Making _ NaWXUe HXman BehaYioXU,´ 
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-018-0489-y. 
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Injunctive Norms 
 Injunctive norms, on the other hand, reflect desirable behaviors or what ought to be done. 
Bicchieri holds that injunctive norms create greater normative expectations than descriptive 
norms, as the praise and blame incentives carry more weight. Injunctive norms relate more to 
morality. Those who conform to injunctive norms don¶t merely want to fit in but want to be seen 
as a good person. Furthermore, those who disobey injunctive norms may face harsher social 
shame. These incentives factor into the individual cost-benefit analysis, nudging people towards 
what are seen as more desirable behaviors. Studies find that this social accountability is not 
replicated with other social practices.102 Although the carrot and the stick are not perfect, and 
many individuals do not mind social shame, injunctive norms are powerful incentives towards 
internalizing new norms. 
 On the individual level, injunctive norms change the balance of costs and benefits of 
particular behaviors. However, as Cristina Bicchieri points out, these decisions are not made in 
isolation.103 Rather, norms can be further understood as a type of prisoner¶s dilemma game since 
one individual¶s choice is conditional on what others do. In a normal prisoner¶s dilemma, an 
individual actor will take the self-interested approach. However, Bicchieri argues that for social 
norms, the game becomes a coordination game where equilibrium is reached through 
conforming. For those motivated by social approval, conforming to moral expectations is in their 
best interest. Thus, new injunctive norms, centered on selfless behavior, may gain traction for 
self-interested reasons. 
 
102 Brennan, Geoffrey, Lina Eriksson, Robert E. Goodin, and Nicholas Southwood. Explaining Norms. Oxford New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2016. 
103 BicchieUi, R\an, CUiVWina, MXldoon, and AleVVandUo SonWXoVo. ³Social NoUmV.´ In The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2018. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2018. 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/social-norms/. 
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 Furthermore, with each iteration of the game, efforts to conform to norms signal an 
ability and willingness to coordinate with other players through reciprocity and mutual 
understanding. An evolutionary approach to norms views such cooperation as integral to forming 
prosocial behavior patterns. Such behavior begins as young as infancy, and by mid-childhood 
sensitivity to norms for collaboration is fully developed.104 This concept of reciprocal altruism 
highlights specific scenarios were “being the nice guy´ provides a salient model for followers.105 
Repetition of such behavior is interpreted as a path of least resistance. Simply put, following 
adaptive behaviors is less cognitively demanding than trying to decipher the correct action 
independently.106 Using an expected value calculation, followers are able to learn from past 
coordination efforts and imitate this success to gain social praise and avoid sanction for non-
conformity. 
 Understanding descriptive and injunctive norms separately gives greater insight into their 
respective strengths, but harnessing the two together yields the most effective results. Research 
from Robert Cialdini finds that in a smoking experiment, the highest percentage of subjects were 
persuaded to quit when they had knowledge that others were quitting and felt that the public no 
longer viewed smoking as normal and began showing disdain for such behavior.107 This 
combination of empirical and normative expectations drew individuals towards the new norm 
and incentivized them away from their old habit. Another study found that subjects were more 
likely to litter in a dirty place than a clean one, highlighting the descriptive norm that no one else 
 
104 Baile\ R HoXVe, ³HoZ Do Social NoUmV InflXence PUoVocial DeYelopmenW?,´ Current Opinion in Psychology, 
Early Development of prosocial behavior, 20 (April 1, 2018): 87±91, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2017.08.011. 
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Methodology, Philosophy, no. 1±3 (September 1, 2011): 472±76. 
107 ³A FocXV TheoU\ of NoUmaWiYe CondXcW: A TheoUeWical RefinemenW and ReeYalXaWion of Whe Role of NoUmV in 
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is littering and injunctive social objections to littering.108 In an area where there was litter, 
however, the descriptive norm goes away, and even though social shame for littering might still 
exists, it is seen as less prevalent or powerful.  
 
Trending Norms 
While this research is promising for norms that have reached maturity, Cialdini¶s 
research also found that when only a small minority of actors follow a norm it may actually 
backfire. For instance, few individuals take full measures to reduce their GHG emissions. 
Highlighting the small percentage of those who reduce emissions may be interpreted as a moral 
outgroup of “do-gooders´ as opposed to a widely followed norm. Actors tend to heavily weigh 
majority opinion, even if misguided, and discredit minority opinion. In a study where low 
engagement in health protective behavior was intended to alarm participants, it instead 
reinforced descriptive norms that such behavior is unnecessary.109 For carbon neutrality, those 
who go to further measures to reduce their carbon footprint may easily be dismissed at fervent 
environmentalists, separate from the everyday behavior of the masses. 
In such cases trending norms emerge as a powerful tool. Research on trending norms 
shows that when individuals see an upward trajectory, they predict such behavior is likely to 
continue.110 As a result, there is an incentive to join this trend early and be ahead of the curve, for 
strategic and social reasons. The study went on to find that communicating increases in 
popularity were more effective than communicating aggregate popularity, as individuals wanted 
 
108 Cialdini, Robert & Reno, Raymond & Kallgren, Carl. (1990). A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: Recycling 
the Concept of Norms to Reduce Littering in Public Places. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 58. 1015-
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109 F. MaUijn SWok eW al., ³MinoUiW\ TalkV: The InflXence of DeVcUipWiYe Social NoUmV on FUXiW InWake,´ Psychology & 
Health 27, no. 8 (2012): 956±70, https://doi.org/10.1080/08870446.2011.635303. 
110 Chad R. MoUWenVen eW al., ³TUending NoUmV: A LeYeU foU EncoXUaging BehaYioUV PeUfoUmed b\ Whe MinoUiW\:,´ 
Social Psychological and Personality Science, December 27, 2017, https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550617734615. 
 77 
to feel that others would be joining this behavior in the future. While descriptive and injunctive 
norms are important for understanding how norms can eventually become powerful motivators 
once developed, trending norms likely provide the best guide on how to proceed with carbon 
neutrality efforts at universities. I will now explore how universities can use this research to 
build upon their own efforts and convince others to follow in their footsteps.  
 
Creating New Norms 
 Given the promising social research on changing norms to create a progressive domino 
effect in society, I will now explore how universities have, and can continue to, create a new 
social norm surrounding carbon neutrality. Since 2006, when The American College and 
University Presidents' Climate Commitment was founded, universities have been first movers in 
advocating and taking action on climate change. While a few small companies had begun 
pledging carbon neutrality in the early 2000s, there was little momentum behind this movement 
and no major actors had taken the imitative. Only a small coalition of 12 university presidents 
originally signed the founding pledge, but by September of 2007 the number of universities had 
jumped to 336. Understanding how this small group of universities expanded into the 677 
universities and growing highlights the power of norm changes to incentivize others to follow. I 
will explore how the initial group of universities were able to act as first-movers to motivate 
fellow universities to join in pledging carbon neutrality and how these efforts can also create 
norm changes on and off campus, prompting faculty, students, and potentially large actors to 
make a similar shift. 
 
First Movers 
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 When creating a new norm first movers often must confront significant obstacles or 
penalties. They may be ostracized for their behavior and face an uphill battle to make their norm 
change accepted. As such, first movers are often worried of facing negative consequences for 
transgressing certain norms and seek assurance. Universities, however, are in a unique position 
where penalties for dissenting from popular opinion carry less influence. They have low norm 
sensitivity and less conflicting interests. This was likely a large influence in the role universities 
have played in past social movements I highlighted and why they were able and eager to be 
among the first to push for carbon neutral commitments 
Rather than overwhelming stigmatization, carbon neutrality¶s main battle is with 
incentives. Climate change involves several prisoner¶s dilemma problems, and taking action to 
reduce emissions is one of the most difficult. It is collectively beneficial for everyone to reduce 
emissions, yet every individual actor wants to free ride and no one wants to be the sucker who 
puts in all the work while everyone else is allowed to benefit. Aside from good will, many of the 
first universities who signed carbon neutrality pledges were betting on the fact that their actions 
would serve as a signal to other players. When these actors sense an upward trajectory there is an 
incentive to hop on and be ahead of the trend.  
First movers took a risk in pledging carbon neutrality, but they also changed the 
incentives for others to join shortly after. Those who jumped on early would be praised for 
taking action before doing so officially become a sanctioned norm, while those who stalled 
might fear social shaming from their colleagues, tarnishing their reputation. One university 
president referred to this “bully pulpit´ as one of the most powerful motivators for rapid 
change.111  
 
111 ClaXdia H. DeXWVch, ³College LeadeUV PXVh foU CaUbon NeXWUaliW\,´ The New York Times, June 13, 2007, sec. 
Education, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/13/education/13green.html. 
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Universities may be among the first to act, but this action can only preside over majority 
influence if relevant actors view the first movers as prestigious. Looking within academia, which 
institutions pledged carbon neutrality first likely had an important influence, specifically schools 
with big names or influence in their respective circles. Outside academia, there is a larger 
question regarding the influence of universities on external actors such as government, 
corporations, or citizens. This legitimacy can be achieved through prestige strategies, where first-
movers display competence in valued domains to elicit admiration.112 Inferring an absolute 
answer to such a subjective and individual interpretation will never be precise, but universities 
are generally viewed with prestige for "conducting and applying research and offering high 
quality study programs."113 Universities are not likely to start a new fashion trend, yet their role 
in society as homes for highly specialized experts lends them legitimacy on normative subjects. 
This expertise serves as a signal, universities carry unique information in society, and there is 
clear value in following these particular actors, even over majority opinion. Such influence will 
not hold for all, but this can work to break down conformism in an attempt to convince the 
consensus that carbon neutrality should not only be viewed as possible, but expected.    
 
Reputation and Pledges 
 Another hurdle for carbon neutrality is that behavioral change takes time due to unique 
challenges. Achieving carbon neutrality does not happen overnight, it is a long continuous 
process and at the time of signing many universities did not expect to accomplish this goal for at 
 
112 Èngel V. Jimpne] and Ale[ MeVoXdi, ³PUeVWige-Biased Social Learning: Current Evidence and Outstanding 
QXeVWionV,´ Palgrave Communications 5, no. 1 (February 19, 2019): 1±12, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-019-
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113 PeWeU MaaVVen eW al., ³The Place of UniYeUViWieV in SocieW\,´ University of Oslo, Körber-Stiftung, 2019, 
https://www.guc-hamburg.de/press/study-place-of-universities.pdf. 
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least 30 to 40 years. Given this vast time horizon, any momentum around norm change could 
easily die out. That is why publically announcing pledges to achieve a change in behavior is a 
powerful tool studied by norm change experts.114 One study looked at recycling rates of 
participants and found that signing pledges raised awareness, increased social pressure, and 
ultimately led to higher recycling rates.115 When a university commits to a certain goal, they put 
their reputation on the line if they fail. Failure to meet targets becomes a mark of shame and can 
lead to a loss of credibility.  
Universities not only knew that this goal would take a lot of time, but that they would 
have to figure things out as they went, working to replace centuries of fossil fuel use which has 
become engrained into almost everything we do. Thus, while pledges were a powerful signal, 
without corresponding action, over time they could grow weaker. Actors could receive the 
publicity and praise that came with announcing an ambitious target for carbon neutrality, 
knowing that once the spotlight was removed there would be little regulation or public attention. 
The incentives seem ripe for abuse, yet fortunately regulatory bodies, and strong leadership 
committed to following through have paved the way for real progress. 
 Climate Action Plans (CAP) are one way universities were able to demonstrate 
commitment to action. CAPs were formed and published as evidence of concrete plans to take 
action, outlining a blueprint of how the university plans on tracking and reducing its carbon 
footprint. Furthermore, while many parts of these plans involve long-term commitments, in the 
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interim leaders have focused on low-hanging fruit or easy and quick implementations to signal 
legitimacy and trust behind their intentions.  
Just as the first 12 universities to sign their pledges both received praise for their action 
and pressured other schools to follow suit, the first universities to actually accomplish their goal 
on an accelerated timeline take advantage of these same two incentives. Middlebury College, for 
instance, was one of the first small liberal arts colleges to achieve carbon neutrality in 2016, 
pressuring rival schools to catch up. Even more impressive, American University achieved 
carbon neutrality in 2018, two years ahead of their intended goal. This was particularly 
impressive given substantial challenges the university faced with a larger student population and 
urban location. These schools are also joined by Colgate University, the University of San 
Francisco, Bates College, Bowdoin College, and Colby College, all having achieved full carbon 
neutrality.116 While not every university will be as ambitious, slackers will slowly grow more 
obvious as more universities race to be among the first to reach their goals.  
 Another way universities are incentivized to take real action on climate change is to 
score well on several “green rankings´ which have emerged to provide the praise and blame 
necessary to motivate behavior. From the coveted top 10 list of green colleges to flouting LEED 
certified buildings on campus, there is a clear benefit for universities that can back up their 
ambitious pledges with concrete and visible action. This of course might not send perfect 
incentives. Universities might become motivated to meet criteria identified by college ranking 
companies, however, many organizations have formed to solve this problem. The Association for 
Advancement of Sustainability in Higher Education (AASHE) created the Sustainability 
Tracking, Assessment and Rating System (STARS) program to encourage transparency and 
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merit rankings on metrics that provide real carbon reductions.117 STARS accomplishes several 
important goals for helping universities set the standard in sustainability. It encourages 
knowledge sharing among universities, not only in tracking their carbon footprint, but efficient 
approaches to reducing emissions and creative ways of incorporating this work into the 
classroom and larger campus community. Finally, through a bronze to platinum rating system 
that rewards real progress, universities can be held to a reputable standard without concerns of 
abuse. 
 
Leadership 
While signing pledges was an important step in raising awareness of a new norm, just as 
vital was the individual leadership backing the writing. University presidents needed to both 
acknowledge the ambition and importance of the task ahead, while also convincing others to 
follow in their footsteps. I will now explore the importance of leadership in bringing new norms 
to fruition and inspiring followers to jump onboard. 
 When faced with ambitious goals like going to the moon, winning a war on poverty, or 
mitigating climate change, leaders often like to provide easy answers. However, leaders must be 
realistic about the challenges they will face and sacrifices that need to be made. To achieve 
carbon neutrality money will need to be reallocated, budgets may need restructuring, and new 
positions will be required. Leaders who are upfront about such challenges are more convincing 
and articulate the abrupt transition in a more approachable and realistic manner.118 
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 Leadership and credibility is especially critical for selling a controversial vision. 
Research on leadership and ambitious goals shows that while selling followers on the vision is 
important, even more significant is the actual leadership itself. Followers want to be captivated 
by a confident, credible, and popular leader to buy-into. Those who agree with the vision are 
further inspired by the example set before them, however, even those who disagree with the 
vision can often be persuaded simply on the merits of the leaders. 119 Further social research 
emphasizes that charismatic leaders use a special set of linguistic techniques in an aim to break 
down and then rebuild or re-align the world views of followers.120 Most challenging, and 
important, for leaders is building the trust necessary to break past tradition and guide followers 
on a new course. While this general theory is not always applicable, examples from JFK to 
Gandhi serve as reminders of how powerful a captivating leader can be, especially when 
followers buy into both the vision they are selling and the leader themselves. 
Social research also backs up the importance of strong role models in norm change as 
followers look for “belief managers´ to guide their behavior. In one study followers were 13% 
less likely to free ride on a public good scenario when a leader was setting an example.121 Further 
research confirms that leaders are especially powerful for shaping followers initial beliefs. 122 
While many carbon emitting behaviors are engrained into our routine and have become 
automatic, individuals have rarely questioned the validity of these decisions. By suggesting to 
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followers that their normative beliefs are in fact misguided, followers may take the leader¶s 
credibility into account and follow a figure of authority. Thus, who starts a norm change is of 
great importance, and university presidents themselves, and the organizations they represent, 
have realized that they can use their credibility to influence others to follow.  
Pushing back, while leaders should be lauded for the strong leadership required to garner 
support behind the carbon neutrality movement, the incentives for presidents signing the pledge 
and the leadership that will be required to carry it out are very different. In this case, the 
president signing the pledge received the immediate glory and praise for agreeing to undertake 
such an important and difficult task, yet the majority of leg work would challenge future 
presidents. This presents an interesting dilemma for leadership theorists. On one hand leaders are 
promoting a positive outcome and are likely heavily involved in setting the foundation and the 
hard work of planning. Yet, while the end result may be positive, there¶s also a chance those in 
leadership positions were perhaps too eager to jump into this ambitious project without 
proactively making long-term plans. Even though leaders who signed pledges likely had a 
variety of motives, their commitment alone was sufficient to spur behavioral change in 
followers.  
Fortunately, many of the steps leaders have taken fit in with research on successful 
leadership and ambitious goals. In an empirical analysis of leadership, one study highlighted 
three key differential factors: a strategy management process, performance measures, and 
proactive support from external stakeholders.123 University presidents acted quickly to create a 
strategy management process with CAPs, many numbering hundreds of pages, outlining how 
 
123Kelman, SWeYen, and Jeff M\eUV. ³SXcceVVfXll\ AchieYing AmbiWioXV GoalV in GoYeUnmenW: An EmpiUical 
Anal\ViV.´ The AmeUican ReYieZ of PXblic AdminiVWUaWion, Yol. 41, no. 3, Ma\ 2011, pp. 235±62. SAGE 
Journals, doi:10.1177/0275074010380450. 
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sustainability can be incorporated into all aspects of the campus, and timelines for achieving 
these goals. Performance measures come from self-reporting data through non-profits like 
Second Nature which help universities achieve this goal, as well as the STARS ranking system.  
Finally, there are numerous external stakeholders that surround presidents, serving as 
valuable resources to bring these pledges to fruition. These include new positions such as 
director of sustainability at universities, committees dedicated to sustainability, and finally the 
coalition of other universities working together, which serves as a support network. Together 
these criteria add credibility to the leadership behind these ambitious targets. 
 
Tipping Points 
 Finally, research on norm change highlights the importance of tipping points. 
Universities may work for months or years to publicize their work on carbon neutrality, educate 
others on science or the importance of taking action, and pressure other actors to take similar 
steps. Progress may be slow at first, but it eventually reaches a fulcrum where rapid change 
emerges. There was certainly a tipping point when carbon neutrality on university campuses 
went from a lofty dream of 12 college presidents to the new norm in higher education, seen by 
the rapid surge of universities signing on to the agreement.  
Another tipping point can be seen on campuses themselves. Many university campuses 
serve as a social “bubble´ and students on the campus may see campus behavior as a new norm, 
even if it is not replicated outside. This provides universities an opportunity to convince the 
majority of students that sustainable behaviors they model are not just for a minority of 
environmentalists, but rather actions that should be taken by all citizens. From energy and water 
reduction, changing diet habits, and reducing or substituting energy intensive travel, students 
 86 
may begin to view such behaviors as a new norm, and spread praise and blame of this norm 
throughout dorm halls and beyond. Physical location is especially important in modeling norm 
change, and university campuses offer an excellent opportunity to impact a large percentage of 
students who will disperse throughout society, potentially impacting more followers.  
Research on the exact percentage of buy in for a new norm varies, with estimates ranging 
from just 10 percent of a population up to around 40 percent. 124 A study from the University of 
Pennsylvania found just how dramatic the shift can be, placing the critical mass of a population 
at 25 percent.125 Using laboratory experiments and real world online observation, the researchers 
found that even at 24 percent, public opinion could not be swayed, yet when 1 percent more of 
the population switched sides on a new norm, whether it be gay marriage or marijuana 
legalization, there was a sudden and rapid shift in group dynamic, radically changing the 
majority opinion. Given this research, there is a sufficient incentive for universities to be one of 
many voices pushing for behavioral change in carbon neutrality, on even the off-chance they are 
part of the one percent that tip the scales in a new direction. 
 
From Theory to Application: Maximizing the Impact 
 Given the potential for social norm change, both within universities and externally, it¶s 
important to examine exactly what types of changes universities should make that will be salient 
to followers while making the largest impact. Research on environmental behavior change 
separates this type of transformation into three main categories. Consumer behavior, for instance 
buying a hybrid car, direct behavior, such as turning off the lights, and finally civic behaviors 
 
124 ³MinoUiW\ RXleV: ScienWiVWV DiVcoYeU Tipping PoinW foU Whe SpUead of IdeaV _ NeZV & EYenWV,´ 
https://news.rpi.edu/luwakkey/2902. 
125 ³E[peUimenWal EYidence foU Tipping PoinWV in Social ConYenWion _ Science,´, 
https://science.sciencemag.org/content/360/6393/1116.editor-summary. 
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like voting or protesting. 126 While norm activation affects all three, it is most powerful for civil 
activities, accounting for 30 percent of variance in behavior. Civil behavioral change is an 
important underlying goal, however, high impact change, measured in GHG reductions, is found  
in direct behavioral and consumer change. 127 Although norm activation can account for 19 
percent of variance in consumer change, this observed upper bound presents a unique challenge 
for universities looking to replicate high impact behaviors. I will now explore how universities 
can strive to improve these margins, looking at obstacles to consumer change specific to carbon 
neutrality and strategies for overcoming them. While some examples have been successfully 
modeled at universities, I also prescribe novel methods based on social norm and sustainability 
research. Finally, I will investigate sustainable behaviors themselves, highlighting changes that 
yield the greatest carbon reductions, as well as “greenwashing´ behavior, which look good, but 
accomplish little. I will conclude with a discussion of carbon offsets as an option, which when 
done properly, can fill in for areas with technological barriers.   
 
Information  
 The first, and likely easiest way to increase sustainable behavior is through information 
campaigns, and universities are particularly suited for this task. Often a lack of knowledge is a 
leading cause of reluctance to reduce carbon emissions, however, misinformation may play an 
even larger role. The most important factor in turning education into action is tailoring audience 
 
126 Paul C. Stern et al., A Value-Belief-Norm Theory of Support for Social Movements: The Case of 
Environmentalism, 6 HUM. ECOLOGY REV. 81, 82 (1999). 
127 Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Allocating Responsibility for the Failure of Global Warming Policies, 155 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1657, 1682±83 (2007). 
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specific approaches based on group-specific reception. While increasing scientific literacy at one 
school might be the match to ignite student motivation at one school, it could backfire at another.   
Likely the biggest issue universities must combat is misinformation. In an era of record 
high social media misinformation campaigns, it is unfortunate that today a high percentage of 
individuals are misinformed about climate change, specifically some of the key ideas outlined in 
the first chapter of this thesis.128 In one study, a majority of college students acknowledged the 
reality of human-induced climate change, yet did not fully grasp the scale of many carbon 
intensive process nor appreciate the potential consequences.129 While denialism of even the basic 
science is clearly a large hurdle for changing behavior, even those who self-reported as 
“concerned´ and “alarmed´ about climate change gave estimates that the scientific consensus 
surrounding anthropogenic climate change is 73% and 84% respectively, when in reality it is 
97%.130 This is due in part to targeted misinformation campaigns, often from those with vested 
interests. On the other hand, climate change is further polarized by apocalyptic claims which 
either paralyze action or reduce trust in the general scientific consensus. 
 In these two domains, universities are perfectly positioned to make a real impact. 
Through classrooms, guest lectures, and orientations universities can set the record straight, 
using their reputation and credibility as experts in the field to make sense of scientific models 
and offer practical solutions. This will be of special importance for those who self-report as 
informed about climate change and sustainability efforts, but have gaps in their knowledge. 
While scientific knowledge is a vital base, studies show that being informed on issues, such as 
 
128 John, Cook. ³TXUning ClimaWe MiVinfoUmaWion inWo an EdXcaWional OppoUWXniW\ ,´ n.d. 
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AWWiWXdeV aboXW ClimaWe Change,´ International Journal of Sustainability in Higher Education 15, no. 2 (January 1, 
2014): 128±41, https://doi.org/10.1108/IJSHE-03-2012-0025. 
130 AnWhon\ LeiVeUoZiW] eW al., ³ClimaWe Change in Whe AmeUican Mind: ApUil 2019,´ SSRN ScholaUl\ PapeU 
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climate change, fracking, or gun control, does not always correlate with corresponding policy 
support.131 This is often due to misconceptions about the solutions themselves as a risk to one¶s 
worldview. I will explore how reframing information campaigns on solutions and ways an 
individual can contribute reduces polarization and is more effective in motivating action. 
 Climate change is an already polarized topic, with clear partisan divides. While university 
political climates vary dramatically, the approach I outline uses social research to examine those 
most resistant to behavioral change. As I mentioned earlier, norms led by minority groups can be 
dismissed as do-gooders, going above the call of everyday morality. Fortunately, studies on 
climate change education campaigns give guidance for how to best inform those most resistant to 
this type of norm change. These approaches focus on framing solutions in approachable ways, 
showing that one can maintain their world philosophy while also embracing small changes. 
One study found that reframing carbon neutrality as part of one¶s personal responsibility 
to not harm others creates a more universal injunctive norm, pushing individuals to hold 
themselves to a higher standard.132  Further studies recommend separating carbon neutrality 
measures from environmentalism entirely, as many feel there is an all or nothing requirement.133 
This allows individuals, especially those who often tend towards denialism, to maintain their 
worldview while making substitutions in their everyday life as part of their duty to reframe from 
harming others. Finally, keeping the message in a positive frame, such as highlighting how cheap 
 
131 Dan M. Kahan, ³ClimaWe-Science CommXnicaWion and Whe MeaVXUemenW PUoblem,´ Political Psychology 36, no. 
S1 (2015): 1±43, https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12244. 
132 JelliVon, JeUald M., and Jane GUeen. ³A Self-Presentation Approach to the Fundamental Attribution Error: The 
NoUm of InWeUnaliW\.´ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 40, no. 4 (April 1981): 643±49. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.40.4.643. 
133 VandenbeUgh, Michael, and Anne SWeinmann. ³The CaUbon-NeXWUal IndiYidXal.´ NYU Law Review, November 7, 
2014. https://www.nyulawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/NYULawReview-82-6-Steinemann.pdf. 
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renewable energy can save lives, leads to better reception than negative statements that make the 
situation seem hopeless. 134 
These studies demonstrate that university administrators and professors must carefully 
craft how they go about dismantling misinformation and building new knowledge without 
isolating those most resistant to change in the process. Luckily, solution-based approaches to 
education maximize reception for the largest audience. For students sympathetic to climate 
change science, high impact behavior changes such as reducing flights, meat consumption and 
individual automobile travel allows them to act on scientific evidence, reinforcing the 
importance of the task and providing direct ways to make tangible changes. For those resistant to 
climate science, highlighting “win-win´ solutions such as energy efficiency measures or cheap 
renewable energy, appeals to free market ideals, thus not threatening their ideology while 
highlighting ways they can wet their feet.135 This proves that solutions do not revolve entirely on 
sacrifice, and that there are often economic benefits in addition to doing the right thing. 
Maximizing the number of stakeholders receptive to these educational campaigns accelerates 
acceptance of new norms. Campuses that stress climate science in the classroom to a broad group 
of students will be best positioned to see the greatest norm acceptance of internal carbon 
neutrality efforts. These will be further enforced through clever incentives many universities are 
testing.  
 
Incentives and Practicing Skills 
 
134 PaXl SchXlW] and L.C. Zele]n\, ³RefUaming EnYiUonmenWal MeVVageV Wo Be CongUXenW ZiWh AmeUican ValXeV,´ 
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 Education builds a crucial foundation and to build upon this, universities are also 
experimenting with different incentive programs with promising results. Some examples include 
making the right thing to do the easiest, turning sustainability into a competition, and reinforcing 
norms through reminders and practice. These pilot programs prove that sometimes a clever 
nudge is sufficient to jump start small behaviors which can eventually build into long-term 
habits. 
 Often the quickest way to build acceptance of new behaviors is to remove barriers. The 
average individual simply follows the path of least resistance when making everyday decisions. 
Consider an everyday example of recycling a plastic water bottle. There is little confusion, 
almost everyone knows that while plastic bottles are bad for the environment and while reducing 
consumption is the best method of alleviating this harm, the next best way is recycling. Yet, a 
quick glance at an average trash can will likely yield dozens of these products. One solution is 
simple, next to every trash can, put a recycling bin, clearly labeled and visible, especially near 
areas of consumption. Faced with a choice between two identical options, a study at universities 
found students will follow the new norm if it is easier and clearly identifiable. 136 This same logic 
applies to many other applications. Universities can offer better parking for hybrid vehicles, 
plug-in stations for EVs, give out free reusable water bottles and fill campuses with refill 
stations, offer bike share programs and accessible shuttles to popular destinations. Many of these 
are not only easier, but can save both students and the university money, providing another 
powerful incentive. 
Other methods are less obvious, but offer similar results. Nudge theory, popularized by 
behavior economist Richard Thaler, finds ways to increase certain behaviors without coercion. 
 
136 ³Effect of Number and Location of Bins On Plastic Recycling at a University,´ 
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One study related to sustainability found putting sustainably sourced foods towards the front of 
the cafeteria increased demand for these items.137 While more of an information campaign than a 
nudge, labeling foods with their carbon footprint increased knowledge on sustainable diet 
choices and directly lowered demand for carbon intensive red meat.138  Lewis & Clark college 
used another kind of nudge by allowing students to opt-in to the purchase of sustainable energy 
for $20 per students. The program received 95% participation which allowed the school to 
increase wind energy to 22%.139  
Other creative incentives seek to make sustainability competitive. Schools like Ohio State 
created a competition for energy use by hall and residence dorm, using smart meters and a prize 
incentive to increase compliance.140 A similar competition between two rival liberal arts 
colleges, Bowdoin and Colby, yielded energy reductions of 7 and 8.7% respectively. The 
University of Hawaii created several energy challenges as part of the “Kukui Cup Project´ which 
reduced dorm energy consumption by 15-20%.  
Finally, many universities use behavioral cues, such as stickers in dorm rooms, to remind 
students to turn off lights or unplug unused electronics.141 Phantom electricity from these devices 
can actually account for up to 10 percent of building energy use and are an easy way to make a 
significant impact. Other examples include signs in parking lots informing campus members that 
idling for more than 30 seconds uses more fuel than restarting the engine.  
 
137 Jolien VandenbUoele eW al., ³NXdging Wo GeW OXU Food ChoiceV on a SXVWainable TUack,´ Proceedings of the 
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EdXcaWion,´ hWWp://ZZZ.VXVWed.com/ZoUdpUeVV/conWenW/making-sustainable-behaviors-the-norm-at-the-university-of-
minnesota-duluth_2013_06/. 
 93 
These effects may seem small and temporary, but there is a potential for positive inertia, 
in the campus and beyond, simply by practicing these behaviors on a daily basis. While many of 
the aforementioned examples are relatively minor, they serve as reinforcement to a new norm, 
reminding individuals of ways they can take action to mitigate climate change, even if they 
appear relatively inconsequential. If one engages in these practices enough, they become part of 
a routine, even if the incentive is removed. Furthermore, as part of a social norm, seeing these 
behaviors practiced routinely around campus reinforce the deductive and injunctive norms 
around these behaviors. Making such behaviors easier or attaching a reward are powerful and 
efficient methods of creating traction for a new norm and making it stick. 
 
What Works and What Looks Good 
 Looking at specific carbon neutrality measures, I will now examine what steps 
universities are taking that yield the greatest carbon reductions. While many solutions offer both 
cost and GHG savings, these are behind the scene and at a large scale. These actions, while 
valuable, are of less use to individual norm change. I will briefly discuss different areas for 
reductions and how universities can balance these high impact practices with more salient, but 
less significant, day to day behavioral changes.  
 Any organization that wants to accomplish a massive task like carbon neutrality would 
likely look first to investments that require low upfront capital or pay for themselves, can be 
accomplished relatively quickly, and offer the greatest ROI in terms of GHG reduction. Luckily, 
data-backed studies provide a general guide on how to proceed, and many universities follow a 
similar model. The four main categories outlined for high efficiency reductions are energy 
efficiency measures including lighting, insulation, and motor-engine efficiency, low-carbon 
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energy such a landfill gas electricity or cheap renewables like solar or wind, carbon sinks such as 
forests, and behavioral change.142 I have mainly focused on behavioral change throughout this 
chapter; however, behavioral change, while significant, is predicted to offer the least potential for 
GHG reductions of these four main categories. The other three categories offer the greatest 
results, but they often exist on an administrative level and present logistical, financial, and 
technological barriers which make individual replication difficult if not impossible. These areas 
provide a model for other universities or large actors to emulate, as I will explore later, but for 
the individual actor the majority of carbon reductions are not salient.  
 This provides a particular challenge. Just as universities are small actors relative to large 
coproations and countries, individuals too may feel that their contributions are too small to 
matter. As I argue in my last chapter, all contributions can be morally important, however, if 
actors view their actions as inconsequential, then norms may be interpreted as prioritizing 
looking good over doing good. This raises questions about greenwashing and moral hazards. 
Sustainability offices might tell students to use paper straws, compost and recycle, and fill a 
reusable water bottle, while significant carbon reductions happen behind the scenes. These 
individual behaviors may benefit the overall environment, but they are not sufficient for reducing 
climate related harms and must not be presented as such. 
 I have argued that actors with the greatest contributions to climate change should be 
responsible for a corresponding percentage of responsibility. This, however, is not mutually 
exclusive from what small actors can do. Similarly, behaviors with the highest ROI often exist 
on an organizational level, and are not available to individuals, especially students. Thus, an 
individual who cannot access many of these practices seems to have a stronger case to excuse 
 
142 ³PaWhZa\V Wo a LoZ-CaUbon Econom\.´ 
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themselves of any duty. While these barriers may be a legitimate obstacle now, I still hold that 
what the individual can do is of moral and practical significance. 
 By reinforcing norms surrounding sustainable behavior, individuals add legitimacy and 
social support to a larger movement. Furthermore, they contribute to a mindset of shared 
responsibility vital for tackling the massive and unpresented project of combating climate change 
as a global collective action problem. However, I hold that many behaviors under the umbrella of 
sustainability must be contextualized. Just as norms created an incentive for universities to 
potentially make empty pledges, this same greenwashing can also spread to individual behavior, 
turning a culture of sacrifice into green materialism and conspicuous consumption. This has the 
potential to create a moral hazard, where individuals may feel relinquished of moral 
responsibility and social pressure by engaging in empty gestures.  
 Thus, universities must turn this dilemma into an opportunity for further progress, setting 
yet another precedent for transparency and research backed solutions which will delineate 
between meaningful efforts and faux sustainability. One method is turning “behind the scenes´ 
efforts into learning opportunities and engaging students in the process. Solar arrays, energy 
efficiency measures, and land management can all be integrated into the classroom with hands-
on learning to make them as accessible and salient as possible. Integrative learning paired with 
mindful behavioral change offers a win-win of meaningful change and education so students 
might take what they learn and apply it after they leave campus. Many students will eventually 
go on to leadership positions in business, government, and non-profits and will be able to apply 
lessons they have learned in high-impact areas of society. 
Offsets 
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 I have spoken in depth about areas where universities can and should make changes to 
the business as usual model, specifically around energy efficiency, vehicle standards, clean 
energy, and behavioral change. These categories encompass a large percentage of university 
emissions, but not all. In fact, on average at least 60% of all university emissions come from 
scope 3 emissions, which involve commuting, airline travel, and upstream and downstream 
purchases. For many of these activities, reduction and replacement is possible, through only to a 
limited extent due to technological limitations. Air travel, for example, ranks as one of the largest 
contributors to climate change yet is often needed for students who live far away or wish to study 
abroad. Faculty conferences also use a high allotment of a university¶s carbon budget. While 
alternatives exist and such attendance can be reduced, these conferences can be vital to sharing 
and creating new literature ins several fields. Thus, the question remains, can these behaviors 
coexist with a university¶s commitment to carbon neutrality? The answer, while not so simple, 
can be yes, and the solution lies with carbon offsets. 
 Carbon offsets have existed practically since the inception of carbon neutrality. The basic 
premise is purchasing credits which can serve as a sink for carbon, storing it underground, for 
example, or as a carbon free alternative that would not have otherwise occurred, like a solar 
field. These are just two example of many that exist in a constantly growing market. But with 
such saturation comes questions about quality and the ethics of buying “indulgences´ which 
incentivize a business as usual lifestyle. Are carbon offsets consistent with the aims of carbon 
neutrality, the credibility of universities, and the type of norm change I outline? The answer: it 
depends. In this section, I will provide criteria to separate meaningful offsets from greenwashing 
and address moral hazard concerns. 
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 As of 2018, the global market for carbon offsets was estimated to be around $40-120 
billion.143 Within this expansive market, offsets range in quality, assurance, and credibility. 
While many companies take scrupulous measures to back the legitimacy of their claims, cheaper 
and lower quality offsets are permitted without regulation. Literature on qualifying factors that 
separate good offsets from lower-tier alternatives hone in on a few key criteria. 
 The first measure is additionality or whether the activity funded through the offset would 
have occurred otherwise. Imagine ran investor builds a new wind farm, one they were set on 
building regardless of external influence. Then, after the farm is built, offsets are sold to cover 
costs of building this farm. Such an example highlights one type of offset where no additional 
benefit to the environment results from the purchase. Another concern with some offsets is bad 
incentives. While economic incentives, like cap and trade or a tax, have been effective in many 
environmental applications, sometimes these incentives can backfire. For instance, a study found 
that Chinese factories were paid based on GHG reductions. As a result, several factories ramped 
up their emissions beforehand so the reductions were higher, yet the net emissions remained 
roughly unchanged.144 These bad incentives, while not ubiquitous, reveal problems that may 
arise, even in offsets with good intentions.   
This relates to another criterion, double-counting. This has been especially contentious 
for countries like Brazil, who are arguing for the right to count their massive collection of 
rainforest as a carbon sink in their country footprint, while also selling offsets to other nations.145 
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While organizations that certify carbon offsets seeks to ensure that no offset is not sold more 
than once, lack of regulation has made this a reoccurring problem that continues to mar the 
reputation of offsets.  
Finally, for certain kinds of offsets, permanence can affect the lifespan and effectiveness 
of the offset. Planting trees is one method of removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. 
However, if there is a forest fire, which climate change increases occurrences of, this carbon is 
released back into the atmosphere. Even if the company providing the offsets is reputable and 
takes steps to minimize leakage, most offsets are not expected to last longer than 100 years, 
buying valuable time, yet not, perhaps, living up to the full essence of carbon neutrality.  
While there are valid concerns for the offset market in general, highly vetted offsets are 
extremely efficient at removing carbon from the atmosphere with a high ROI. Planting costal 
mangrove forests stores up to 5 to 10 times as much carbon as an acre of rainforest.146 Another 
great example is industrial gas destruction for HCFs and nitrous oxide, which is 300 times more 
potent of a GHG as carbon dioxide. Offsets like these offer real carbon reductions with scientific 
backing. It seems then, that universities might even consider skipping the arduous process of 
mitigation when they can simply offset their carbon footprint. 
While this may seem like an appealing option, many push back and argue that even the 
most effective and highly regulated offsets are not morally permissible. Comparing the act of 
purchasing offsets to purchasing indulgences, one is allowed to continue their sinful behavior, 
having simply paid a small fee to do so. As a result, there may be a moral hazard where business 
as usual is incentivized and reckless behavior may increase, all while actors maintain a moral 
high ground. 
 
146 Umair Irfan, ³Can YoX Reall\ NegaWe YoXU CaUbon EmiVVionV? CaUbon OffVeWV, E[plained.,´ Vo[, FebUXaU\ 27, 
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While this moral objection has valid points, I disagree that if an offset meets the criteria I 
have outlined it should have no place in an organization or individual¶s carbon neutrality plan. 
Earlier, I gave a thought experiment of punching someone in the face, and then paying them after 
for the damage inflicted. I argued there is no moral justification for such behavior since it 
violates one¶s autonomy, even if the sum matches the crime. I argue offsets are of a different 
nature than this thought experiment. In this case an offset, if credible, serves to remove the punch 
in the first place. Due to the dispersive nature of GHGs, a source on side of the planet and a sink 
on the other may truly counterbalance each other.  
Even given such effectiveness, other moral philosophers attack the consequential 
framework itself. Michael Sandel argues there is more to weigh than simply net emissions. 147 He 
feels that rights, justice, and equity deserve equal consideration to quantitative measures. One 
thought experiment he offers to convey this argument is paying a fine to throw garbage into the 
Grand Canyon. Imagine, for instance, everyone who litters in this park is caught and fined, and 
then this money is used to fund employees who clean the park. In the case, the net trash is zero, 
yet there seems to be something inherently wrong with the kind of attitude where one, usually of 
greater wealth, is allowed to act without restraint while others, usually of lower income, are 
forced to clean up their mess. In this case there is also an opportunity cost, workers who could 
possibly be working to improve the park, are instead diverted to fix a problem caused by human 
behavior. 
This prevailing attitude is of particular concern to norm change. It is possible that the 
progress in norm change I have outlined in this chapter could be reversed if actors believe 
behaviors themselves do not need to change and one can simply write a check. As Sandel writes, 
 
147 Sandel, Michael J. What Money Can¶t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets. 1st ed. New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 2012. 
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offsets might become “a painless mechanism to buy our way out of the more fundamental 
changes in habits, attitudes, and ways of life that may be required to address the climate 
problem.´148 While net emissions might remain the same, without new norms, high emission 
behaviors will not face the social shame needed for widespread acceptance. Those who buy 
offsets will be do-gooders and high carbon behaviors, such as driving an inefficient SUV, will be 
stripped of moral stigma. This removes any spillover or domino effect as buying offsets is not 
publically visible in the same manner as these behavioral changes. 
While equity and justice deserve moral consideration, I hold that the lack of spillover-
effect is the greatest loss of using offsets versus mitigating through behavioral change. In this 
sense, while some offsets may offer greater efficiency than behavior change, due to 
inconsistency, it can be difficult to truly ascertain the full impact of any offset purchased. Given 
this risk, and the lack of spill-over effect, organizations should avoid offsets when there are 
readily available alternatives to mitigate. Specifically, for scope 1 and 2 emissions, which an 
organization can directly control, real solutions should be prioritized. I argue, nonetheless, that 
there is a role for offsets in reducing scope 3 emissions where no alternative exists, often due to 
technological limitations. While faculty and students can purchase fuel efficient car, carpool, or 
take public transportation, they ultimately need to get to and from the campus when necessary. 
For these examples, offsets offer the next best alternative, a way for a university to reduce their 
footprint when all other methods are exhausted.  
 
148 ibid 
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Universities that purchase or create their own can follow certain steps for best practices. 
Projects in the vicinity of campus can help increase visibility and make a positive local impact. 
Finally, universities can exclusively purchase offsets pre-approved by credible organization, such 
as the Gold Standard founded by the World Wildlife Fund, which has a reputation for 
maintaining strict standards, taking into account the local social and economic effects of offsets 
in addition to maximizing the benefit of projects. With these criteria as a guide, universities can 
find a niche role for offsets while waiting for technology to catch up, setting a strong example for 
those who follow. 
    
Large Scale Change 
I have argued how universities can use internal campaigns to affect small individual 
actors, specifically students, and create a new social norm on campus. I will now argue that 
universities can create a similar shift, but for larger actors, such as corporations, states, or even 
nations, building upon similar social norm tools, while introducing strategic partnerships and 
knowledge sharing. The underlying idea is that universities face many unique obstacles as a first 
mover. Having achieved or made great strides in working towards the difficult task of carbon 
neutrality, universities are perfectly situated to guide others down the same path. An apt analogy 
can be seen with sledding. The first to go down the hill faces heavy and uncompressed snow, 
making it a slow and arduous process. However, after the first sled ride, the snow is packed 
down, and others are rewarded with a quicker and easier ride.  
In this final section, I will start by looking at key criteria for partnerships between 
universities and corporations, and how both can maximize these relationships, specifically for 
collaboration on carbon neutral challenges. Finally, I provide several real world examples of 
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universities influencing large actors, either by working directly with partner institutions or 
sharing knowledge to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes.  
 
University-Corporate Partnerships 
 Universities and other institutions, like governments or for profit corporations, have very 
different incentive structures and operations. A university has special obligations and goals that 
often conflict with profit driven interests. As former university president Peter Likins puts it, “A 
corporation's purpose is to maximize financial benefit while operating within societal constraints; 
the university primarily maximizes societal benefits within financial constraints.´ 149 
Nonetheless, partnerships do exist, and when done properly serve to benefit both parties. Likins 
emphasizes that in such cases, universities are realistic about the importance of profit motives 
and industry accepts the need to make research public and accessible. Building off this 
framework, I will provide guiding principles to maximize this relationship for both parties, with 
a focus on finding common ground while remaining conscious of differences. Then, I will divide 
these partnerships into two broad categories: direct collaboration, such as consulting, and indirect 
collaboration, which includes norms, research, and training, using examples of current 
relationships that exemplify these opportunities. For the latter category, I will rely heavily on 
reports from the University of California¶s coalition of campuses, which have served as a “living 
laboratory´ for carbon neutrality efforts, specifically solutions designed to scale up. While 
different in approach, all these efforts share the common goal of expanding upon existing carbon 
neutrality efforts, sharing knowledge to increase adaptation for some of the largest global 
emitters.  
 
149 ³UniYeUViW\-CoUpoUaWe PaUWneUVhipV,´ http://www.columbia.edu/cu/21stC/issue-3.1/likins.html. 
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 Although such partnerships must face the intrinsic challenges of conflicting incentive 
structures, sustainability ventures provide unique opportunities for collaboration. The corporate 
sector rarely engages in knowledge sharing, seeking to profit of any novel innovation. However, 
the scientific urgency of climate change has led to a culture of transparency and collaboration not 
commonly seen.150 This can be expanded through university-corporate alliances, which are most 
successful when both parties acknowledge their inherent conflicts, yet also bring something 
unique to the table. A study which summarized research on sustainability focused partnerships 
found that corporate partners look for projects with a strong business case and academic 
institutions which specialize in a core competency, setting them apart in some way.151 Businesses 
are also looking to enhance their reputation and commitment to ESG (Environmental, Social, 
Governance) while learning leaner ways to reduce their footprint.152 Furthermore, the demand 
from corporations for sustainability development is real and growing. In a global survey of 766 
CEOs from 100 countries, 78% believed that companies should engage in sustainability related 
collaborations and partnerships, looking outside industry for novel approaches.153 
On the other side, universities look for ways to solve real problems and learn from long-
term partnerships, align faculty research with industry needs, and create learning and career 
opportunities for students. In these final sections I will provide examples of both direct and 
 
150 10 G. SWUeeW NE SXiWe 800 eW al., ³Making ClimaWe CompanieV¶ BXVineVV,´ WoUld ReVoXUceV InVWiWXWe, JXne 27, 
2013, https://www.wri.org/our-work/project/world-resources-report/making-climate-companies%E2%80%99-
business. 
151 GiVelle We\bUechW, ³PaUWneU WiWh BXVineVV SchoolV Wo AdYance SXVWainabiliW\,´ 2015, 
https://www.unprme.org/resource-docs/businessbschoolpartnerships.pdf. 
152 BaUbaUa GUa\ and Jenna SWiWeV, ³SXVWainabiliW\ ThUoXgh PaUWneUVhipV: CapiWali]ing on CollaboUaWion,´ 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5d5156083138fd000193c11a/t/5d62ae9b2f2f230001e85db2/1566748369464/
NBS-Systematic-Review-Partnerships.pdf. 
153 Lac\ PeWeU eW al., ³A NeZ EUa of SXVWainabiliW\ UN Global CompacW-AccenWXUe CEO SWXd\,´ 2010, 
http://livebettermagazine.com/eng/reports_studies/pdf/UNGC_Accenture_CEO_Study_2010.pdf. 
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indirect partnerships and recommendations on how to build upon these case studies, taking into 
account the needs of both parties. 
 
Direct Collaboration 
 While less research is available on direct partnerships between universities and 
companies on sustainability efforts, these explicit partnerships serve as a model for what is 
possible, especially with the abundance of indirect assistance I will explore later. One study 
looked at three examples of corporate-university partnerships at Plymouth University in the UK, 
American University in Bulgaria, and Harvard University, using these case studies to extrapolate 
general results that can be applicable to future ventures.154 First, Plymouth University 
highlighted how universities can serve as anchor institutions for large spread local change. 
Working with small and large local businesses, Plymouth University developed a regional 
innovation ecosystem, centered around a local circular economy. This partnership was unique in 
using sustainability as the glue to bring together the local business community into one 
innovation network, drawing in an impressive $40 million of public funding and $70 million of 
private investments. 
 At American University, administrators and students engaged with CEOs, particularly 
from the Bulgaria Soft Drink Association (BSDA), with companies including Coca-Cola and 
Devin Water. These CEOs were able to witness the value of internal behavioral change on 
campus and were inspired to use this educational experience as part of a long-term consulting 
engagement which is currently in progress. In fact, the strong institutional culture played a large 
 
154 PXUcell, HenUikVen, and SpengleU, ³UniYeUViWieV aV Whe Engine of TUanVfoUmaWional SXVWainabiliW\ WoZaUd 
DeliYeUing Whe SXVWainable DeYelopmenW GoalV.´ 
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role in convincing these CEOs of the importance of keeping an open dialogue about 
sustainability at work and in private life. 
 Finally, Harvard University demonstrated the potential of a partnership as a “living 
laboratory´ to test carbon neutral strategies through strategic engagements with local and global 
corporation. One example highlights how valuable the interdisciplinary nature of universities can 
be for leading the way in sustainability. A collaboration between Harvard¶s School of Public 
Health, Medical School, School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Office for Sustainability 
worked with Google to co-create sustainable methods for construction of new buildings and 
renovations. In addition to this partnership, Harvard also seeks to share carbon neutral strategies 
with the Boston Green Ribbon Commission, a group of local business, civic, and institutional 
leaders. Specifically, Harvard focuses on research backed solution-based framing to increase 
reception and promote innovation.155  
Harvard embodies the concept of a living lab by understanding that its campus, like many 
others, serves as microcosm of society, incorporating housing, food services, transportation, 
construction, energy, and building maintenance into one sustainability plan. This then creates a 
test bed where best practices emerge through trial and error and can be shared with partners. Of 
all the benefits of these collaborations, Harvard particularly shows how these direct partnerships 
benefit students, leading to interdisciplinary research opportunities, project-based learning, and 
engagement with business leaders. 
 Overall, these examples highlight three different methods for university-corporate 
partnerships, though, there are numerous other approaches possible. One key takeaway from all 
three universities was a feedback loop of engagement, where universities that publicized research 
 
155 C. K. PUahalad Ram NidXmolX, ³Wh\ SXVWainabiliW\ IV NoZ Whe Ke\ DUiYeU of InnoYaWion,´ Harvard Business 
Review, September 1, 2009, https://hbr.org/2009/09/why-sustainability-is-now-the-key-driver-of-innovation. 
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and raised awareness on current initiatives were actively sought out for consultancy and custom 
research. Such projects will likely continue to grow as corporate demand for sustainability 
matures. I will now explore methods of indirect influence, whether through research, norm 
change, or training, which provide the best starting point to for universities that haven¶t formed 
these relationships to provide high-impact value or eventually transition towards direct 
partnerships. 
 
Indirect Influence: An Opportunity for Greater Change 
 Although these indirect “partnerships´ are less developed, universities committed to 
carbon neutrality are creating a model along the way, both as a norm of what is expected in 
society and a tangible guide for best practices, that large actors have and can continue to 
reference. In this final section, I will focus on the University of California as a powerful example 
of how universities can educate and set an example for similar large institutions, convincing 
them of the benefits of carbon neutrality and making the process seem less daunting. The 
transparency and depth of reports from the University of California is not an anomaly, and more 
universities could use it as a standard for knowledge sharing, which emphasizes scalability and 
future corporate integration. 
 With ten campuses, five medical centers, and three national laboratories, the University 
of California¶s carbon neutrality pledge is no small undertaking. Furthermore, the variation of 
campuses allowed for a living-laboratory approach where different techniques could be tested 
and compared. This ultimately led to the publication of two studies which reflect on challenges 
the university faced and opportunities for improvement and ten practical solutions that are 
scalable for states or even countries. In fact, the state of California, the 5th largest economy in the 
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world, used insights from these reports in guiding their own carbon neutrality efforts, and the 
campus was even visited by representatives from China looking for inspiration.156 I will highlight 
key takeaways form these two research reports and argue that through similar reports universities 
can work together to help guide the world through carbon neutrality. 
 One of the biggest questions around carbon neutrality is what will it take and how much 
will it cost. From a business perspective, the latter question is crucial to convincing large 
corporations to even consider the idea. Without this financial data, it is much easier for efforts to 
be dismissed or put off. To this end, the University of California report titled “Overcoming 
Barriers to Carbon Neutrality´ seeks to be very transparent and thorough about fiscal 
reporting.157 Balancing funding constraints, debt capacity, and competing budget interests, 
administrators were able to highlight low-cost solutions that would keep operating costs as close 
to baseline as possible. For example, reinvesting energy efficiency savings in a revolving fund 
allowed universities to increase the carbon reductions of each dollar. The study found most 
energy efficient measures would start saving the school money within 5 to 10 years. Including 
these savings into cost analyses proves that many low-emission strategies are less expensive than 
they appear. Renewable energy provides another example, where administrators tested both the 
technology and the market. UC Berkeley and San Diego¶s campuses were used to run 
experiments on solar energy, battery storage, and micro grids to move away from carbon 
intensive forms of energy production. On the purchasing side, long-term contracts for solar 
 
156 ³Bending Whe CXUYe: Ten Scalable SolXWionV foU CaUbon NeXWUaliW\ and ClimaWe SWabiliW\,´ OcWobeU 27, 2015, 
https://uc-carbonneutralitysummit2015.ucsd.edu/_files/Bending-the-Curve.pdf. 
157 ³OYeUcoming BaUUieUV Wo CaUbon NeXWUaliW\: A RepoUW of Whe CaUbon NeXWUaliW\ Finance and ManagemenW TaVk 
FoUce,´ AXgXVW 1, 2017, hWWpV://Xcop.edX/caUbon-neutrality-initiative/_files/overcoming-barriers-to-carbon-
neutrality.pdf. 
 108 
power offered the University cost savings and a fixed energy rate that can be locked in for 
decades.  
 The report goes on to list similar cost-focused recommendations for transportation, 
purchasing, offsets, and new building construction. Additionally, to further their understanding 
of costs and benefits, the university paid for third-party consultants to evaluate different 
pathways, and those results were published, providing further cost savings. Throughout the 
report, the authors note how these efforts can encourage and guide similar institutions, which 
often share more logistical similarities than differences. Given these similarities, there is a hope 
that research reports like this will increase the line of communication and knowledge sharing 
between academic communities and companies, developing skills and helping all parties 
involved advance their sustainable goals. The success of one institution, even relatively small, 
can be the success of all if knowledge is shared and more actors begin to buy in to the idea that 
this change is possible.  
 The report concludes by noting that science, engineering, and business will not be 
enough. To fill in the gaps, researchers emphasize the importance of social science research, 
particularly norms to shift understanding, attitudes and behavior. This reinforces the importance 
of cultural buy-in as the foundation for large-scale change. Other actors, whether corporations, 
states, or even national governments must also be aware of the limitations of “top-down´ 
approaches to sustainability. Without this base, carbon neutrality efforts can only go so far. 
Luckily, universities across the country are modeling a positive example for carbon neutrality, 
proving that these necessary targets are not only feasible, but worthwhile. The University of 
California refers to its campuses as living laboratories for “the art of the possible,´ and often 
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merely proving a goal can be accomplished is a crucial first step in convincing reluctant actors to 
follow.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
As the time of this writing, the current reaction to COVID-19 provides a near perfect 
analogy of how society has created new social norms for behavior based on scientific evidence 
and morally unacceptable levels of risk. Although there is a risk of getting the virus itself, the 
call for quarantining and social distancing focuses on doing one¶s part to help others. While one 
individual may be inconsequential in the larger picture, millions of individual actors taking 
similar steps to slow the spread of the disease can save lives. It would be easy for one actor to 
freeride off the good-will of others, but public opinion has largely shunned such behavior as 
selfish and reckless. Although measuring small levels of risk is difficult, and the causal 
relationship between actors and victims is more concrete with COVID-19, reducing spread of a 
disease passes the same expected utility test as reducing one¶s emissions.  
More fitting, this effort was in part lead by universities. One of the first major shutdowns 
across the United States was of university campuses, some of which made the decision weeks 
before other major actors in society. This then spurred a very rapid and powerful chain reaction 
among universities, which eventually moved its way up to major companies and even 
government. Not only did universities feel pressured to take action in moving to online classes 
because other institutions around them were doing so, but there was also growing injunctive 
expectations that closing down the university was the new norm as part of a social responsibility 
to limit the spread of the disease. While many colleges and universities went remote to protect 
students or due to government pressure, other universities likely took their cues from trend 
setters in the academic community. When Amherst and Harvard College first shutdown and 
moved classes online, this put social pressure on other universities to follow suit due in part to 
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the influx of news articles and press. Of course, there was rational arguments behind these 
decisions, but the timing and pressure was highly affected by the rapid formation of a new 
trending norm.  
It is clear that there was a spillover effect from universities¶ actions, leading the rest of 
society to take situation more seriously. Just as university carbon neutrality efforts send a signal 
about the urgency of the scientific data and the necessity of individual action, the rapid closure of 
practically all major universities in the US sent a signal to society before the waves of reported 
cases and deaths began to rise. Take another individual norm, wearing masks. In other cultures, 
particularly in Asia, wearing a mask is a norm associated with doing one¶s civil duty to prevent 
other from getting sick. In America, no one could have predicted that masks could catch on due 
to the stigma associated with wearing one and looking out of place. Yet, due in part to new social 
norms that have arisen, rooted in the urgency and gravity of scientific evidence, demand for 
masks outside the medical field have dramatically outpaced supply.  
In both climate change and public health, the language of flattening the curve is used, 
acknowledging the harms of overly demanding solutions, but requiring society bring the risk 
down to manageable levels. The immediate danger of COVID-19, emphasized by growing 
infection and mortality rates, led to a very rapid transformation of norms and corresponding 
behavioral change that has been relatively successful in abating the worst damages of this deadly 
virus. Research on using analogies to teach climate change actually highlights analogies to 
medical diseases as a perfect example. Specifically, the similarities of human aggravated harms, 
progressively worsening damage functions, symptoms outside the range of past experiences, 
uncertainties for the future, side effects of treatments, and difficulty in reversing once past a 
 112 
certain threshold. 158 Most critically, it is usually cheaper to proactively treat the underlying 
problem than dealing with the fallout later. Unfortunately, climate change, while similar on many 
levels, faces a time delay, thus making the consequences out of sight and mind. As I have 
argued, the moral reasoning behind inaction for a negative duty, regardless of time horizon, is 
inexcusable, yet the psychological explanation holds true. Unless we are able to start treating 
climate change with the urgency it demands, future generations will have to deal with the 
ramifications. 
While reading the news on the current pandemic, I came across a quote from Michael 
Leavitt, the former Secretary of Health and Human Services, that I think applies perfectly to the 
pandemic we face now and the climate crisis we are heading towards. Leavitt said, “Everything 
we do before a pandemic will seem alarmist. Everything we do after will seem inadequate.´ I 
think this nicely sums up the challenge we face. Deniers downplay the science since it threatens 
their worldview. Others might dodge individual responsibility or underestimate the social 
influence of seemingly small actions. Finally, many will say carbon neutrality is not possible or 
unrealistic. I have argued all of these views are incorrect. Mitigating climate change passes a 
cost-benefit analysis and is supported by science. Individual actors play a role in this collective 
action problem, and given the moral urgency of the situation, small actions can yield 
unacceptable levels of risk. Finally, these actions are not in isolation and universities, as first 
movers, can initiate a chain reaction, proving carbon neutrality is both possible and expected and 
showing others how to get there.  
Throughout this thesis I have referenced many domino effects. Some are deeply 
concerning, such as the positive inertia of climate feedback loops seen with latent heat or melting 
 
158 ³The PUomiVe and LimiWaWionV of UVing AnalogieV Wo ImpUoYe DeciVion-Relevant Understanding of Climate 
Change,´ https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0171130. 
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ice caps. Others present moral dilemmas, like how behavior today can set in motion a chain of 
events that might commit future generations to a very different world, harming many during this 
violent change. Yet, in the face of a growing crisis, solutions too can scale to meet the challenge 
and create ripples in society. I have argued, optimistically I hope, that universities can have a 
local, national, and even global impact through teaching, advocating, and sharing solutions to 
climate change. What started as 12 tiny signatures now has the attention of the nation and the 
momentum to knock over much larger dominos. The goal is in sight and the path is paved, now 
all that is left is ensuring we get there before the timer runs out.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
